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ECONOMISTS  and policymakers  have long been interested in measuring 
the effects of changes in the returns to and costs of business fixed invest- 
ment.  That  interest  reflects  both  theoretical  and practical  concerns, 
which have stimulated a large body of empirical research using aggre- 
gate and micro-level data. This literature has reached few unambiguous 
conclusions. ' 
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The theoretical  concerns  are clear.  Because  firm demand for fixed 
capital is a derived demand, changes in the value of installed capital or 
in the cost of purchasing or using capital should, all else equal, be funda- 
mental determinants of investing.  However,  specific applications of this 
general proposition,  including the user cost  of capital and q model ap- 
proaches,  have not proved empirically  successful.2  By the late  1960s, 
the neoclassical  model developed  by Dale Jorgenson and his collabora- 
tors had become the standard model for studying investment decisions.3 
The neoclassical  approach offers a structural link between tax policy pa- 
rameters-the  corporate tax rate, the present value of depreciation  al- 
lowances,  and the investment  tax credit-and  investment  through the 
user cost of capital.4 Robert Eisner, both in solo work and in work with 
M. Ishaq Nadiri and Robert Chirinko, and other authors have  noted, 
however,  that the empirical link between  investment  and the user cost 
of capital is tenuous.5 By the 1980s, models based on the q representa- 
tions had largely replaced those based on the user cost of capital for ana- 
lyzing investment.6 However,  the q models have also explained invest- 
ment poorly  using aggregate time-series  data or firm-level data. Very 
small estimated effects of q on investment,  implying implausibly high es- 
timates of the cost of adjusting the capital stock, make it difficult to infer 
effects  of changes in market valuation or tax parameters on investment. 
One forceful empirical criticism of the user cost  of capital and q ap- 
proaches has been that they fail to explain investment as well as ad hoc 
models emphasizing sales or profits with no proxies for the net return to 
investing.7 Recent  research on the consequences  of asymmetric  infor- 
mation in financial markets has offered an interpretation of this finding: 
2.  Appendix A derives both approaches in a common framework. 
3.  See Jorgenson (1963) and the application to tax policy in Hall and Jorgenson (1967). 
4.  Alternatively,  Feldstein (1982) explored the effects  of effective  tax rates on invest- 
ment in reduced-form models; for a critique of this approach, see Chirinko (1987). 
5.  Eisner (1969, 1970), Eisner and Nadiri (1968), and Chirinko and Eisner (1983). 
6.  Hayashi (1982) provided the conditions required to equate marginal q with average 
q, which is observable  since  it depends  on the market valuation of the firm's assets.  In 
an important extension,  Summers (1981) incorporated additional tax parameters in the q 
model. An alternative to using financial variables as proxies for marginal q is to use a fore- 
casting approach, as in Abel and Blanchard (1986) on aggregate data and more recently in 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1991, 1992) on firm-level panel data. 
7.  See, for example, Clark (1979,1993),  Bernanke, Bohn, and Reiss (1988), and Oliner, 
Rudebusch, and Sichel (forthcoming-a). Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  3 
when a firm's net worth improves,  lenders become more willing to lend, 
holding constant  "true" investment  opportunities,  allowing  additional 
capital spending to be financed.8 With few exceptions,  however,  empiri- 
cal studies have not offered structural models that permit evaluation of 
policy changes.9 
The practical concerns about investment models are also clear. Busi- 
ness fixed investment  accounts for only about 10 percent of GDP in the 
United  States  but is much more volatile  than consumption  or govern- 
ment purchases.  Policymakers  have responded to this volatility by try- 
ing to manipulate tax policy  to  smooth  investment  spending.  Sixteen 
shifts in business  taxation in the postwar period have resulted, roughly 
one every three years. 
This manipulation of tax policy  suggests that policymakers  perceive 
some responsiveness  of business fixed investment to tax changes. How- 
ever,  the empirical evidence  is far from conclusive.  10  That is, not only 
have models  emphasizing  the net return to investing  been defeated  in 
forecasting "horse races" by ad hoc models, but, more important, struc- 
tural variables are frequently found to be economically  or statistically 
insignificant. 
A general difficulty with existing  empirical studies is their failure to 
identify exogenous  shifts in the marginal profitability of investment  or 
in the user cost of capital. As a result, analyses  rely on very imprecise 
measures of q or the user cost of capital. Studies using the user cost of 
capital confront a significant measurement error problem, in that invest- 
ment  depends  upon  observed  current and expected  future  values  of 
many fundamentals.  Given the discreteness  of tax changes,  future val- 
8.  See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Calomiris 
and Hubbard (1990), and Oliner and Rudebusch (1994). 
9.  Exceptions  include Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (1994), Cummins and Hubbard 
(1994), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (forthcoming), and 
Sakellaris (forthcoming). 
10.  See  Bosworth  (1985), Bosworth  and Burtless (1992), and the survey in Chirinko 
(1993). The often  poor empirical performance  of q models  has led some  researchers  to 
abandon the assumptions  of reversible  investment  and convex  adjustment costs  used in 
testing neoclassical  models in favor of approaches based on lumpy and "irreversible" in- 
vestment.  See the discussions  and reviews of studies in Pindyck (1991), Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), and Hubbard (1994); for some  empirical applications,  see  Bertola and Caballero 
(1990), Bizer and Sichel (1991), Caballero and Engel (1994), Caballero and Pindyck (1992), 
Leahy and Whited (1994), and Pindyck and Solimano (1993); for a synthesis  of alternative 
modeling approaches,  see Abel and Eberly (1994). 4  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
ues of the user cost of capital are difficult to project linearly. "I  The q for- 
mulation confronts  a slightly different, but equally troublesome,  mea- 
surement error problem if fluctuations in firm value cannot be explained 
by fluctuations in expected  future profitability. 12 Studies focusing on in- 
ternal funds as an explanatory variable for investment,  holding invest- 
ment opportunities  or observable  measures  of the user cost  of capital 
constant,  face the problem that changes in internal finance may simply 
measure fundamentals better than financial market prices. 
This paper focuses  on the effects of changes in fundamentals on busi- 
ness  fixed investment  using adaptations  of the tax-adjusted q and the 
user  cost  of  capital  models.  We  stay  within  the framework  of those 
models  because  of  their  widespread  use  among  economists,  prac- 
titioners,  and policymakers.  We attempt to improve upon existing  ap- 
proaches by using tax reforms  to identify determinants of investment de- 
cisions.  Major tax reforms offer natural experiments for evaluating the 
responsiveness  of investment to fundamentals affecting the net return to 
investing.13 Each  such  tax  reform represents  a discrete  event  with  a 
large and discernible effect on the return to investment.  Below  we pre- 
sent estimates for the period between  1962 and 1988, which encompas- 
ses several business tax reforms. 14 
Although we are interested in macroeconomic  policy issues,  our anal- 
ysis relies on firm-level panel data rather than aggregate time-series data 
for two  reasons.  First,  panel  data allow  us  to  exploit  the  significant 
cross-sectional  variation in investment  opportunities and in the cost of 
investing.  Second,  for our use of tax reform episodes  to be revealing, 
11.  The Brookings panel discussion  of the pooI  results for the neoclassical  model in 
Clark (1979) stressed  many of the issues  addressed here. Martin Feldstein,  for example, 
argued that the user cost variable used in that study might be severely  mismeasured. Rob- 
ert Hall suggested  that there might be a simultaneity  problem: higher investment  might 
cause a rise in interest rates. We address both of these issues. 
12.  Such problems could be accounted for by noise trading (as in De Long and others, 
1990) or by differences in information available to internal managers and financial markets 
(as explored in Gilchrist and Himmelberg,  1991, 1992). 
13.  We expand on Auerbach and Hassett  (1991), Calomiris and Hubbard (1993), and 
Cummins and Hassett (1992). Romer and Romer (1989) use a similar approach to analyze 
the effects of monetary policy surprises on economic  activity. 
14.  Steigerwald and Stuart (1993) present evidence  that major reforms are largely un- 
anticipated until the year before enactment and that firms behave as if the current tax code, 
including known future changes,  is permanent; Givoly  and others (1992) present similar 
results in their study of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Jason  G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glennt  Hubbard  5 
reforms should be exogenous  to investment decisions.  In addition to in- 
terest rate endogeneity,  it is also unlikely that the taxation of investment 
is exogenous  at the aggregate level. 15 Even a casual examination of ag- 
gregate time series for detrended equipment investment and the invest- 
ment tax credit for equipment reveals  this endogeneity.  Policymakers 
have  introduced  an investment  tax  credit  when  investment  was  per- 
ceived  to be "low" and removed the investment tax credit when invest- 
ment was perceived  to be "high." 16 However,  because  the composition 
of the capital stock varies across firms, tax policy designed to alter ag- 
gregate investment affects individual firms differently, and this variation 
is less likely to be endogenous  in disaggregated data. We use this insight, 
combined with the firm-level panel data to control for dynamic aspects 
of the investment decision,  to estimate structural models of investment. 
Tax Reforms  and Incentives  for Investment 
Before describing our technique for exploiting tax reforms as periods 
in which we can identify structural determinants of firms' investment de- 
cisions,  we  describe  below  the  tax reforms that occurred  during our 
sample period, the cross-sectional  variation (by asset type) in tax incen- 
tives during reforms, and the cross-sectional  relationship (across asset 
types) between changes in investment and in its tax treatment. 
Business  Tax Reforms 
There were 13 arguably significant changes in the corporate tax code 
during the 1962-88 period, beginning with the Kennedy  tax cut in 1962 
and ending with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  1' Before explaining the de- 
tails of each change,  it is useful to provide an overview  of the trend in 
the corporate tax burden. 
The statutory corporate tax rate was reduced steadily from 52 percent 
in 1962 to 34 percent in 1988, except between  1968 and 1970 when a sur- 
15.  Hall in the general discussion  of Clark (1979). 
16.  The estimated  coefficient  from an ordinary least squares regression using the ag- 
gregate investment tax credit to predict aggregate equipment investment-to-capital  ratio is 
significant but negatiNe. 
17.  For discussions  and historical reviews of the changes, see Auerbach (1982, 1983a), 
Pechman (1987), and U.S.  Senate Committee on the Budget (1986, 1992). 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
charge was imposed.  The investment  tax credit was first enacted Janu- 
ary 1, 1962, and was in effect through 1986, except for two periods from 
October 10, 1966, to March 9,  1967, and from April 19, 1969, to August 
15, 1971. The credit was increased three times, and the number of assets 
eligible for the credit has expanded.  Depreciation  allowances  became 
more generous,  culminating in the Accelerated  Cost Recovery  System 
introduced by the Economic Recovery  Tax Act of 1981, but were subse- 
quently limited by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility  Act of 1982, 
which introduced the Modified Accelerated  Cost Recovery  System. 
The Kennedy  tax cut introduced an investment  tax credit for most 
types of equipment. The effective rate was generally 4 percent. The Rev- 
enue Act of  1964 lowered  the corporate tax rate from 52 percent to 50 
percent for 1964 and from 50 percent to 48 percent for 1965. The 1964 act 
also modified the investment tax credit so that the credit was no longer 
deducted from the cost  of the asset  before computing depreciation for 
tax  purposes,  effectively  doubling  the  benefit  of  the  investment  tax 
credit.  The credit was then suspended  in 1966. The Revenue  and Ex- 
penditure Control Act of  1968 introduced a corporate income  tax sur- 
charge of 10 percent. The investment  tax credit was reinstated in 1967. 
For 1970, the surcharge was reduced to 2.5 percent, and the investment 
tax credit was  eliminated.  The  surcharge was  removed  for  1971. For 
1972, the investment tax credit was reintroduced, and the first major lib- 
eralization  of depreciation  allowances  was  enacted.  Asset  lives  were 
shortened  through the asset  depreciation  range system.  Taking these 
changes together, the effective  credit rate was generally about 7 percent. 
The credit was temporarily increased to 10 percent in 1975. In 1979, the 
corporate tax rate was lowered from 48 percent to 46 percent,  and the 
temporary increase in the investment tax credit was made permanent. 
The Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of 1981 provided the second major 
liberalization  of  depreciation  allowances.  It  replaced  the  numerous 
asset  depreciation  classes  with  three  capital  recovery  classes.  Light 
equipment was written off over 3 years, other equipment over 5 years, 
and structures over 15 years. The reduction was modified one year later 
by repealing the accelerations  in the write-off that were to occur in 1985 
and  1986 and by  instituting  a basis  adjustment  of  50 percent  for the 
credit. As a result, the effective  rate was generally about 8 percent. The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the corporate tax rate to 40 percent in 
1987 and to 34 percent in 1988 and eliminated the investment tax credit. Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  7 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Auerbach (1982.  1983a), Pechman (1987), and U.S.  Senate  Committee  on the 
Budget (1986,  1992). 
a.  The  tax  wedge  is  calculated  from  Y, which  is  the  sum of  the present  value  of  tax  savings  from depreciation 
allowances  and the  investment  tax  credit.  Higher  values  for  the  tax  wedge  (I -  Y) correspond  to  higher after-tax 
costs  of investing. 
To summarize this information, figure 1 plots typical values of the tax 
wedge for equipment and structures investment  for each year between 
1953 and 1989. (The samples differ because  the first year for which we 
can  estimate  our model  using  Compustat  data is  1962, but we  use  a 
longer  sample from the  Bureau of Economic  Analysis,  BEA,  for de- 
scriptive  purposes.)  The tax wedge  plotted-described  more formally 
below-equals  (1  -  F), where F is the sum of the present value of tax 
savings from depreciation  allowances  and the investment  tax credit.18 
An increase in the value of (1 -  F), as, for example,  following the 1986 
change,  corresponds  to an increase  in the after-tax cost  of investing;  a 
decrease  in the value of (1  -  F), as,  for example,  following  the  1962 
change,  corresponds  to a fall in the after-tax cost of investing.  Table  1 
presents the average values of the corporate tax rate, the investment tax 
18.  The plot is of (1 -  F) for a representative  equipment asset (special industrial ma- 
chinery) and a representative  structures asset (industrial buildings). 8  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
Table 1.  Average Tax Parameters for Manufacturing Equipment and Structures, 
1953-88 
Equipment  Structures 
Present  Present 
value of  value of 
Corporate  Investment  depreciation  Investment  depreciation 
Year  tax rate  tax  credit  allowances  tax  credit  allowances 
1953  0.520  0.0000  0.3107  0.0  0.1981 
1954  0.520  0.0000  0.3451  0.0  0.2475 
1955  0.520  0.0000  0.3461  0.0  0.2476 
1956  0.520  0.0000  0.3471  0.0  0.2475 
1957  0.520  0.0000  0.3487  0.0  0.2475 
1958  0.520  0.0000  0.3453  0.0  0.2436 
1959  0.520  0.0000  0.3425  0.0  0.2406 
1960  0.520  0.0000  0.3366  0.0  0.2358 
1961  0.520  0.0000  0.3273  0.0  0.2279 
1962  0.520  0.0399  0.3781  0.0  0.2339 
1963  0.520  0.0390  0.3688  0.0  0.2253 
1964  0.500  0.0657  0.3544  0.0  0.2175 
1965  0.480  0.0657  0.3484  0.0  0.2127 
1966  0.480  0.0657  0.3462  0.0  0.2098 
1967  0.480  0.0000  0.3404  0.0  0.2040 
1968  0.528  0.0658  0.3366  0.0  0.2001 
1969  0.528  0.0658  0.3272  0.0  0.1954 
1970  0.492  0.0000  0.3190  0.0  0.1628 
1971  0.480  0.0000  0.3150  0.0  0.1608 
1972  0.480  0.0675  0.3351  0.0  0.1568 
1973  0.480  0.0674  0.3302  0.0  0.1548 
1974  0.480  0.0674  0.3323  0.0  0.1565 
1975  0.480  0.0962  0.3385  0.0  0.1593 
1976  0.480  0.0962  0.3354  0.0  0.1582 
1977  0.480  0.0961  0.3312  0.0  0.1570 
1978  0.480  0.0962  0.3260  0.0  0.1561 
1979  0.460  0.0962  0.3262  0.0  0.1589 
1980  0.460  0.0962  0.3304  0.0  0.1619 
1981  0.460  0.0987  0.3890  0.0  0.2710 
1982  0.460  0.0789  0.3980  0.0  0.2720 
1983  0.460  0.0789  0.3913  0.0  0.2670 
1984  0.460  0.0789  0.3749  0.0  0.2380 
1985  0.460  0.0789  0.3540  0.0  0.2230 
1986  0.460  0.0789  0.3294  0.0  0.2110 
1987  0.400  0.0000  0.2918  0.0  0.1280 
1988  0.340  0.0000  0.2814  0.0  0.1260 
Source:  Authors' calculations using data from Auerbach (1982, 1983a), Pechman (1987), and U.S.  Senate Committee 
on the Budget (1986,  1992). Jason G. Cummins,  Kevin  A. Hassett, and R. Glenn  Hubbard  9 
credit, and the present value of depreciation allowances  for representa- 
tive classes  of equipment and structures. 
Our criteria for identifying key tax reforms are as follows: (i) the value 
of the tax wedge must have changed in absolute value by at least 10 per- 
cent; (ii) no tax shift of that magnitude occurred in the preceding or suc- 
ceeding year; and (iii) the reforms are unanticipated in the year before 
the reform. By these criteria, we identify "major reforms" as those tax 
changes occurring in legislation enacted in 1962, 1971, 1981, and 1986.'9 
Cross-Sectional  Variation in Tax Treatment during Reforms 
In addition to changing the tax treatment of investment  on average, 
tax reforms are also associated with changes in the relative tax treatment 
of  different  assets.  This  cross-sectional  variation-stemming  mostly 
from differences in depreciation across assets-is  critical for the formal 
experiments we derive in the next section. 
Many previous researchers have constructed  aggregate measures of 
the marginal tax on investment  by using tax rules for particular asset 
types and capital stock data that document the relative importance of the 
different assets.20 Industry measures for tax depreciation can be easily 
constructed,  for example,  by taking weighted averages of the marginal 
value of tax depreciation, with the share of each asset in the total capital 
stock of that industry as weights. 
Since the key variation in the tax treatment occurs at the asset level, 
we begin at that level. Figure 2 plots the annual values of the tax compo- 
nent used in our study, (1 -  F), for the 22 classes  of equipment capital 
classified  by the Bureau of Economic  Analysis.  Figure 3 provides  the 
same description of the variation for the 14 different types of structures 
classified  by the BEA.  Table 2 details the type of assets  in each asset 
category. In both figures 2 and 3, the peaks and valleys along the "year" 
axis for a given asset reveal the time-series  variation in the tax parame- 
ters, and those along the "asset" axis for a given year reveal the cross- 
19.  Legislation  passed  in 1954 met these  criteria, but, owing to data constraints,  we 
did not analyze this reform. 
20.  See,  for example,  Hulten and Robertson  (1982), King and Fullerton (1984), and 
Auerbach (1983b). Our estimates  for corporate tax rates and depreciation rules are taken 
from Auerbach and Hassett (1992) and are discussed  in more detail below. 10  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based upon data from the Bureau of Economic  Analysis. 
a.  The  tax  wedge  is  calculated  from F,  which  is  the  sum of  the present  value  of  tax  savings  from depreciation 
allowances  and the investment  tax credit.  Higher values  for (I -  F) correspond  to higher after-tax costs  of investing. 
b.  See  table 2 for BEA  classifications. 
sectional  variation.  For asset  eight (metalworking machinery),  for ex- 
ample, the after-tax cost of investing falls in 1962, 1972, and 1981, and 
rises in 1986. 
The figures reveal that the variation across assets is large within most 
years in our samples,  as is the time-series variation. In addition, the po- 
sitions of the peaks and valleys change somewhat over time. For exam- 
ple, following the removal of the investment tax credit and the reduction 
of the corporate tax rate by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the cross-sec- 
tional variation across assets fell, consistent with the act's stated goal to 
"level the playing field." 
Cross-Sectional  Relationship  between Investment 
and Its  Tax Treatment 
For our purposes,  the important question  is whether this cross-sec- 
tional variation is significant. Below,  we argue that tax reforms allow us Jason  G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  11 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  upon data from the Bureau of Economic  Analysis. 
a.  The  tax  wedge  is calculated  from  F,  which  is  the sum  of  the present  value  of  tax  savings  from depreciation 
allowances  and the investment  tax credit.  Higher values  for (I - F)  correspond  to higher after-tax costs  of investing. 
b.  See  table 2 for BEA  classifications. 
to  identify  investment  models  when  they  provide  large and enduring 
shifts in the cost  of or net return to investment.  We examine  whether 
simple forecast errors for types of investment and their user costs of cap- 
ital exhibit a systematic  negative correlation during the tax reforms. If 
the cross-sectional  variation in tax parameters is economically  signifi- 
cant, we should see that a positive  "surprise" in the user cost of capital 
for a particular asset is associated  with a negative "surprise" in the quan- 
tity of investment  in that asset.  In figures 4-7,  we plot autoregressive 
forecast errors for each of the disaggregated investment  series against a 
similar forecast  error for a simplified user cost  variable.21  Each figure 
plots one of the four years in which a "major"  tax reform took effect. The 
assets are the same as those used in the three-dimensional illustrations in 
21.  We construct the user cost here under the assumptions that the relative price of the 
capital good is unity and that the real interest rate is 0.04. As elsewhere  in this paper, the 
asset depreciation rates are from Jorgensen and Sullivan (1981). 12  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Table 2.  Asset Classifications in BEA Data 
Equipment 
1.  Furniture and fixtures 
2.  Fabricated metal products 
3.  Engines  and turbines 
4.  Tractors 
5.  Agricultural machinery,  except  tractors 
6.  Construction  machinery,  except  tractors 
7.  Mining and oilfield machinery 
8.  Metalworking machinery 
9.  Special  industrial machinery 
10.  General industrial machinery 
11.  Office and computing machinery 
12.  Service  industry machinery 
13.  Electrical  transmission,  distribution,  and industrial apparatus 
14.  Communications  equipment 
15.  Electrical  equipment 
16.  Trucks,  buses,  and trailers 
17.  Autos 
18.  Aircraft 
19.  Ships and boats 
20.  Railroad equipment 
21.  Instruments 
22.  Other equipment 
Structuires 
23.  Industrial buildings 
24.  Commercial buildings 
25.  Religious  buildings 
26.  Educational  buildings 
27.  Hospital  and institutional buildings 
28.  Other nonresidential  buildings,  excluding  farm 
29.  Railroads 
30.  Telephone  and telegraph 
31.  Electric  light and power 
32.  Gas 
33.  Petroleum pipelines 
34.  Farm nonresidential  structures 
35.  Mining exploration  shafts and wells 
36.  Other nonresidential  nonbuilding structures 
Source:  Bureau of Economic  Analysis. 
figures 2 and 3,  with those  numbers above  22 representing  structure 
assets.  The figures illustrate a negative correlation between the forecast 
errors, consistent  with the neoclassical  theory.22 
22.  For illustrative purposes,  we  have plotted  the data for the years that the major 
changes took effect,  using simple AR(1) forecasting equations.  Timing around reforms is 
complicated,  and below,  when  constructing  our estimators,  we  are very  conservative 
when  constructing  the forecast  errors, starting the forecast  well  before  the reform and 
forecasting the variables' values for the year following the reform. Figure 4.  Forecast Errors for Equipment Investment and Equipment Price,  1962 Reforma 
Residual 
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Figure 7.  Forecast Errors for Equipment Investment and Equipment Price,  1986 Reform  a 
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Modeling the Effects of Tax Reforms on Investment 
In this section,  we describe the techniques we use to study the effects 
of tax reforms on investment. 
The Approach 
We now describe the technique used to estimate the determinants of 
firm investment.  Consider the following  general model of investment, 
which here is related to models based on tax-adjusted q, the user cost of 
capital, and internal funds models: 
(1)  Ii,t1Ki,t  I  =  Ei,,_,  (Si,y)  +  Ei,tg 
where I and K denote  investment  and the capital stock,  respectively;  i 
and t are the firm and time  indexes,  respectively;  S  is an underlying 
structural variable (either tax-adjusted q or user cost  of capital) or set 
of variables; Ei,  I is the expectations  operator for firm i conditional on 
information available at time t -  1; y is a coefficient  whose  structural 
interpretation relates to assumptions  about convex  adjustment costs;23 
and  E  is  a white-noise  error term that reflects  optimization  error by 
firms.24 
Traditionally, such models have been estimated using either ordinary 
least squares or generalized method of moments techniques with instru- 
mental variables, and linear projections have been used to form the ex- 
pectation  on the right-hand side  of equation  1. The  introduction  sug- 
gested  that  this  approach  might  not  be  promising  for  studying  tax 
changes,  since  tax reforms are infrequent and difficult to predict.  Our 
approach is (i) to assume that major changes in S are infrequent and not 
easily predictable with standard projection techniques  and (ii) to design 
an empirical experiment that will nonetheless  allow us to isolate the ef- 
fects of changes in S. 
23.  Studies have typically assumed convex  costs of adjusting the capital stock in order 
to obtain empirical investment  equations  based on Jorgenson's  (1963) or Tobin's  (1969) 
approaches.  The basic idea is that it is more costly  to implement a given increment to the 
capital stock quickly rather than gradually. Following  the initial formalization by Eisner 
and Strotz (1963), key applications include Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Abel (1980), and 
Hayashi (1982). 
24.  Incorporation of more complex error structures is possible.  For ease of exposition, 
we make the simplifying assumption above. 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
The first observation  is that the expectations  employed  by firms to 
construct their investment  plans may well be formed from information 
beyond that reflected in linear projection techniques.  This might be the 
case, for example,  if the firm has access  to information (such as a news- 
paper or a trade newsletter)  that announces  the true value of the struc- 
tural variable S.  For example,  firms knew with certainty what the key 
tax variables for 1987 would be in September 1986; they could read them 
in the newspaper.  Just after the reform, it is likely that firms expected 
future tax policy  to reflect the current tax code,  because,  at the very 
least, it takes some time to legislate changes in the tax code. When a tax 
reform year is distant, however,  it is difficult to determine a firm's ex- 
pectations concerning both the likelihood of future tax changes and their 
direction. Under these assumptions,  the econometrician  can accurately 
measure the relevant expected  tax variables only immediately following 
the tax reform, and, further, there is no need to construct forecasts  of 
future tax variables using instruments at these  times  because  the key 
structural variable  (expected  S)  is observable.  Hence,  we  treat S as 
known immediately following reforms and rewrite equation 1 as 
(2)  Iit1Kit_1  = Sit-y  +  Eit. 
If equation 2 holds, the deviation of true (I/K) from the value that is lin- 
early predictable using information available at time t -  1 is 
(3)  Ii tlKi t- Il-Pi  t- I (Ii t1Ki  t_ I) =  (Sit  t-  Pit-  I Si t) PY  +  Ei,tg 
where P is a projection operator constructed from a nontax subset of the 
firm's information set. More conveniently, 
(4)  (Oij  =  yi,t  +  Ei,tv 
where w measures the deviation of investment from what it would have 
been without the exogenous  shock to the structural variable, and VP  mea- 
sures that shock. 
Equation 4 states that the econometric  "surprise" to investment  will 
be proportional to the "surprise" to the structural variable if firms are 
aware of changes in S that cannot be predicted using a linear projection 
onto  the beginning-of-period  information set.  If we  isolate  periods  in 
which firms observe  the true value of S, then we can estimate  y by con- 
structing a cross-section  of observations  of the variables in equation 4. 
To implement this approach, we use first-stage regressions  to construct 
estimates  of wi, and 4ip,  and then pool a cross-section  of these  to esti- 
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Alternatively,  one could use this cross-section  to estimate equation 1 
directly, but the former approach is likely to be more powerful.  By ex- 
pressing the variables in terms of their deviations  from conditional ex- 
pectations,  we control for important cross-sectional  heterogeneity.  In 
fact,  this  estimator  can  be  thought  of  as  the  "difference  from  own 
means" estimator, in which individual firm means are replaced by indi- 
vidual conditional  expectations.25 If firms indeed observe  the true tax 
variable,  then this approach sidesteps  the errors-in-variables problem 
with  respect  to  the  underlying  structural variables.  Finally,  this  ap- 
proach mitigates the problem of endogenous  tax policy faced by time- 
series models. If the surprises are tax policy surprises, then we can treat 
the variation of the tax variables in the right-hand side of equation 4 as 
exogenous. 
In order to construct our estimator, we make the identifying assump- 
tion that around tax reforms we can observe  the S used by firms when 
formulating their investment  decisions.  In principle,  this includes  the 
nontax elements as well. To avoid the introduction of contemporaneous 
values of the nontax components of S, which might introduce simultane- 
ity bias into the second-stage  regression,  we assume that the firm's ex- 
pected value for each nontax component  of S is equal to that variable's 
value at the beginning of the previous period. That is, we construct St by 
combining the tax components  for period t and the nontax components 
for period t -  2. It is this variable that we forecast  in the first stage and 
this variable that we use to construct the "surprise." Tax information is 
the only information dated ahead of year t  -  2 that is included on the 
right-hand side  of our second-stage  regression.  For example,  the ex- 
pected interest rate in 1987 is assumed to be the year-end rate for 1985. 
This assumption  has received  empirical support from Douglas  Steiger- 
wald and Charles Stuart.26 
25.  If one uses only a constant term in the first-stage projection, then the estimator is 
exactly  a difference-in-own-means  estimator,  applied only in the year of the tax reform. 
The substitution of firm-specific conditional expectations  for firm means adds power: firm 
means may be a poor measure of what investment  would have been at time t had there 
been no tax-induced shift in the net return to investing. 
26.  Steigerwald and Stuart (1993). Violation of our assumption concerning the observ- 
ability of S would introduce into the second-stage  regression  the deviation  of "true" ex- 
pected S from our assumed S. It is straightforward to show that our estimate of the struc- 
tural parameters will be unbiased if this is a white-noise  error. As a further specification 
check, we investigate whether the inclusion of variables that should be correlated with this 
potential omitted variable alters our estimate of y. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
When a tax reform year is distant, the identifying assumption that the 
true value of S is observable  is clearly tenuous.  In years following  sub- 
stantial changes  in the tax code,  y should be of the expected  sign and 
precisely  estimated if our identifying assumption is correct.  In periods 
during which there were no changes in the tax code,  y should be impre- 
cisely  estimated and, to the extent that we are measuring the structural 
variable with  significant error, biased  toward zero.  In periods  during 
which there were changes that were part of a previous tax reform (such 
as the reduction in the corporate tax rate from 40 percent in 1987 to 34 
percent  in 1988), the value of  y depends  on whether linear projection 
techniques  adequately describe firms' expectations  following  an initial 
tax  reform.  If they  do adequately  capture expectations,  y is uniden- 
tified.27 
Care in choosing the timing of the experiment is crucial. For example, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was passed late in that year, and it is unclear 
whether  investment  decisions  during 1986 could possibly  have antici- 
pated these  changes.  To avoid confounding timing issues,  we sidestep 
tax  change  years.  For  example,  we  estimate  a first-stage  projection 
equation for each firm, using data available for that firm through 1985 
and then construct forecasts  for 1987, the first postreform year. Gener- 
ally it is the year following  a reform in which we expect  to see the first 
effects of reform. To the extent that information about future retroactive 
changes alters firm behavior, we might observe  significant responses  in 
reform years as well.  If the underlying model is correct, those firms for 
which our forecast error in S is smallest will be the firms whose  invest- 
ment we predict best.28 We pay the same attention to timing for each tax 
change we  study, forecasting  postreform investment  with information 
available in the year before the reform and examining effects of changes 
in the structural variable on investment in the first postreform year. 
27.  The identification occurs only when we encounter  a period in which the firm ob- 
serves a change in S that can not be predicted with the information in P (as, for example, 
during a tax reform in our setup). If the projection measures expected  S perfectly,  y would 
be unidentified given the definition of +  in equation 4. 
28.  Pagan (1984) has shown that the second-stage  parameter estimates  and their stan- 
dard errors are consistent  and asymptotically  efficient,  respectively,  when  the second- 
stage regressors are innovations.  We require numerous assumptions  to map our problem 
to that result, and, for generality,  one would prefer maximum likelihood.  The likelihood 
function for this two-stage  estimator is not difficult to write, but estimation would be ex- 
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The years in which there were no tax changes  act as our "control." 
The "treatment" is the tax reform. If the experiment  is well designed, 
and our characterization of the shortcomings of previous empirical work 
is accurate,  we should observe  a strong response  in the periods during 
which  there  has  been  a  "treatment."  The  effects  on  investment  of 
changes  in the net return to investing  should be difficult to measure in 
nonreform years. The finding of little effect in the "control" years is an 
important link between  our paper and the literature, since  it helps ex- 
plain why empirical results are often inconclusive. 
Tax-Adjusted q, the Cost of Capital,  and Investment 
There are four standard ways of obtaining empirical representations 
of investment  models  emphasizing  the net return to investment.  Each 
begins  with the firm maximizing  its net present  value.  The first-order 
conditions lead to an Euler equation describing the period-to-period op- 
timal path of  investment.  Andrew  Abel  and Olivier  Blanchard  have 
solved  the difference  equation  that relates  investment  to its expected 
current and future marginal revenue products.29  Alternatively,  the Euler 
equation itself may be estimated.30 As in work by both Alan Auerbach 
and Abel,  investment  can be expressed  in terms of current and future 
values of the user cost of capital and, under some conditions,  expressed 
in terms of average q.31 This final approach was first suggested by James 
Tobin, with the necessary  conditions  supplied by Fumio Hayashi.32 We 
relate the q and user cost of capital models of investment to the approach 
discussed  above. 
We estimate both of these models, because we feel that this is a robust 
test  of  whether  we  are estimating  the  true "structural" coefficients. 
While the estimation  equations  differ significantly depending upon the 
path taken in solving the model,  the basic structural setup is the same, 
so comparing coefficient estimates across specifications  is a useful spec- 
ification check.  Since the investment  specifications  we test are largely 
familiar, we refrain from repeating derivations presented elsewhere  and 
29.  Abel and Blanchard (1986). 
30.  See Abel (1980), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983), Shapiro (1986), and Hubbard and 
Kashyap (1992). 
31.  Auerbach (1983b) and Abel (1990). 
32.  Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982). 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
focus on the estimation equations.  Appendix A provides a formal deri- 
vation of the models. 
Following both Hayashi and Lawrence  Summers, who derive the re- 
lationship between q and investment in the presence of quadratic adjust- 
ment costs,  we represent the tax-adjusted q approach as follows:33 
(5)  IitKi  p  =  I  Li +  fQ1(i,t ?  t 
where  p.  is a firm-specific constant,  Ql  is a coefficient  whose  value is in- 
versely  related to adjustment costs,  E is an error term (as in equation  1 
above),  and Q is the tax-adjusted value of q.34  In other words, 
(6)  Qi=  qi,  -  pt(1 -  Fi,) 
where 7  is the corporate tax rate, p is the price of capital goods relative 
to output,  and F is the present value of tax savings from depreciation 
allowances  and other investment  incentives.  For example,  with an in- 
vestment tax credit at rate k, F is 
x 
(7)  Fi, = ki, + E  (1 + rs +  -F e) -TsDEPiJ(s  -t) 
s = t 
where r is the default risk-free real rate of interest,  and DEPi  s (a) is the 
depreciation allowance permitted an asset of age a discounted at a nomi- 
nal rate that includes the expected  inflation rate -ae. 
In the user cost of capital formulation, the firm equates the marginal 
product of capital and the user cost of capital, C:35 
p,(l  -  ri,  [Pit +  b.  -  (Ap+I (-v  i,t+ ))I 
(8)  Ci,t  (1-),t 
where p is the firm's required rate of return, 8 is the rate of economic 
depreciation,  and A is the differencing operator. 
33.  Hayashi (1982) and Summers (1981). 
34.  This presentation assumes that new equity issues are the firm's marginal source of 
finance; see,  for example,  Hayashi (1985) for alternatives.  In both the Q and user cost of 
capital models we derive, we assume that firms face the statutory tax parameters. We are 
thus  abstracting from complications  introduced  by asymmetries,  such  as those  arising 
from tax-loss carryforwards and the alternative minimum tax. 
35.  See Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Auerbach (1983b). Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  21 
When quadratic adjustment costs  and multiplicative  shocks  to the 
firm's production function are incorporated, the firm determines current 
investment based on current and expected future values of a term similar 
to equation 8. Firm i's investment rule is given by 
(9)  Ii,tlKi,t-  I  =  [Li +  (Ei,t  E  ZIW  Ci,S  +  Ei,t, 
s  = 
where e and w are technology parameters depending on adjustment costs 
and the long-run average  of the user cost  term, and c is defined as in 
equation 8; the subscripts  i and s recognize  that components  of c may 
vary across firms and time.36 We proceed  with the variables defined in 
equations 5 and 9 substituted for S in equation 4. 
Using equations  5 and 9 to estimate  equation 4, we assume for sim- 
plicity that firms believe  that the tax reform in the year it is enacted  is 
permanent.37  Prior to a tax reform, S will depend on firms' beliefs about 
the likelihood  and significance of tax reforms. These  beliefs  are unob- 
servable,  and we have little confidence that the tax code per se is an ac- 
curate description of firms' beliefs in these periods. Immediately follow- 
ing a reform,  however,  we  have  argued that it is more reasonable  to 
assume that firms place a much greater weight on the existing tax code 
(because,  at the very least, initiating another significant reform requires 
a lengthy legislative process).  Thus, another identifying assumption im- 
plicit in our approach is that any expected  changes in the code are suffi- 
ciently far away that they receive  no weight in current decisions.  If this 
assumption is not accurate,  our estimates  of the effects  of tax changes 
will be biased toward zero. 
Finally, for the estimation of both the tax-adjusted q and user cost of 
capital models,  we allow only contemporaneous  tax surprises to enter 
into our second-stage  estimation. Other variables, such as interest rates, 
whose exogeneity  is otherwise questionable,  are fixed at their prereform 
values.38 
36.  To simplify, we have assumed that the productivity term in the derivation in Auer- 
bach (1989) equals unity and that the long-run average of the user cost can be factored out 
into (. 
37.  This assumption  is not strictly necessary.  For reasonable  values  of the discount 
rate, a three-year horizon (which closely  matches the mean time between tax reforms) is a 
first-order approximation to "permanent." 
38.  This is the same as in Steigerwald and Stuart (1993). 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
Internal Funds  and Investment 
A significant body of research has emerged relating investment to the 
availability  of  internal funds,  holding constant  investment  opportuni- 
ties.  To the extent that we find that tax policy  is an important determi- 
nant of investment,  one might argue that our results depend on the omis- 
sion of "internal funds," which may be correlated with other structural 
variables. If our estimates are truly structural, they will not be altered if 
we include other explanatory variables. To check the robustness of our 
results  in this  context,  we  include  cash  flow  surprises  in the  second 
stage. 
Empirical work in this literature has sometimes  been  criticized  be- 
cause current cash flow may be correlated with future profitability, and 
thus  might well  be  a proxy  for unobserved  indicators  of profitability 
(such as the true marginal q).39 Shocks to firms' internal funds that result 
from tax policy, for a given pretax income,  are an obvious candidate for 
an exogenous  shift in the availability of internal finance.40 To explore 
this line of inquiry, one could develop  an analogous tax reform-based 
natural experiment as follows.  Suppose that the firm forms an expecta- 
tion of its pretax net income (as a ratio to its beginning-of-period capital 
stock),  Eit_yi,t.  As  long  as this  expectation  is determined  using the 
same lagged information available to financial markets (used in deter- 
mining tax-adjusted q), Ei t-  y  yi,t  should have no predictive power for in- 
vestment.  The tax surprise in this case equals the change in the average 
effective  corporate tax rate multiplied by Eit- I  yit-that  is,  the unex- 
pected  after-tax income.  By design,  this additional term in the tax-ad- 
justed  q model described earlier does  not capture unexpected  changes 
in pretax income, which might convey  information about investment op- 
39.  Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1991, 1992) argue, however,  that cash flow appears to 
be an important explanatory variable for investment,  holding constant a number of plaus- 
ible empirical proxies for marginal q. The Euler equation approaches cited earlier are also 
immune to this criticism. 
40.  In this vein,  Calomiris and Hubbard (1993) use firm-level data to explore  firms' 
reaction to the undistributed profits tax of  1936-37,  which levied  a graduated surtax on 
retained earnings. They find that investment decisions  of firms that simply increased divi- 
dend payouts to avoid the tax could be adequately represented by conventional  neoclassi- 
cal models.  Cash flow effects  on investment,  holding constant  investment  opportunities 
measured by q, are attributable only to the set of firms that incurred significant surtax pay- 
ments. Calomiris and Hubbard argue that these firms traded off the cost of the surtax pay- 
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portunities  not captured in beginning-of-period  tax-adjusted  q; it cap- 
tures only the surprise in after-tax net income (as a consequence  of the 
tax reform) for a given anticipated pretax net income.  We leave this lat- 
ter test for future research, however,  as the correct tax rate for this ex- 
periment is the firm-specific expected  average tax rate, and construction 
of this rate is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Data  and  Estimation:  Firm-Level  Data 
The data set we use in the remainder of our empirical work is a 36- 
year (1953-88) unbalanced panel of firms from the Compustat Industrial 
data base.4' Compustat data are reported in 20-year waves,  so the 1989 
file is combined with the 1973 file to make a continuous  panel. Variable 
definitions are standard except  for our measures of tax-adjusted q and 
the user cost of capital. We exploit additional firm-level information in 
Compustat to construct more precise estimates of q and the user cost of 
capital and to add to the cross-sectional  variation in the panels. 
The variables we use are defined as follows.  Gross investment  is the 
sum of the changes  in the net stock of property, plant and equipment, 
and depreciation.  Gross  equipment  investment  (used  to  estimate  the 
user cost of capital model) is the change in the net stock of machinery 
and equipment plus the firm-specific depreciation rate multiplied by the 
beginning-of-period  capital  stock.42 The  investment  variables  are di- 
vided  by  the  values  of  their own  beginning-of-period  capital  stocks. 
Cash flow is defined as pretax income,  before extraordinary items, plus 
depreciation  and  amortization.  This  variable  is  also  divided  by  the 
beginning-of-period capital stock.  Where appropriate, variables are de- 
flated by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product. 
We experimented  with additional macroeconomic  variables as first- 
stage  instruments.  These  included  the price of  investment  goods,  oil 
prices,  and various  interest  rates.  We found that including additional 
variables had little effect on the results. For the reported results, we use 
41.  Compustat data tapes are compiled from company  annual data by Standard and 
Poor's. 
42.  Compustat does not separately report equipment depreciation; we estimate it us- 
ing the procedure outlined in appendix B. The level of SIC disaggregation changes because 
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the most parsimonious specification,  including only lags of investment, 
cash flow, and a time trend. 
There are several data construction  issues  that merit attention.  The 
number of firms in the panel decreases  in 1971. The Compustat Indus- 
trial file reports data only for those firms still in existence  at the end of 
the 20-year reporting period. As a result, in 1971, the year in which the 
1989 file begins,  there are firms included in the old wave but not in the 
new one. We chose to retain those firms to avoid deleting data from our 
relatively small beginning-of-period panels.43 
Additional  difficulties  arise  in using  equipment  data.  Data  on  the 
gross stock of equipment capital are first reported in 1969. In order to 
construct the gross stock of equipment capital before 1969, we multiply 
the firm's gross stock of property, plant, and equipment by the annual 
share of equipment in gross capital stock for the firm's two-digit industry 
(according to the standard industrial classifications,  SIC), as reported by 
the BEA. Thus, the equipment share is never missing before 1969. After 
1969, the number of firms in our sample drops because  the equipment 
share in Compustat is missing for many firms. 
We  make two  significant improvements  in the construction  of  the 
user  cost  of  capital.44 First,  we  construct  firm-specific  depreciation 
rates, using the method outlined in appendix B, rather than using the de- 
preciation rates for one-digit SIC codes that were constructed with data 
from Charles Hulten and Frank Wykoff's  1981 study combined with ag- 
gregate capital stock weights.45 Second,  for our user cost of capital ex- 
periments,  we  construct  a firm-specific  required rate of  return using 
Compustat data on firms' interest expense  and total long-term and short- 
term debt.46 These  changes  necessarily  introduce measurement  error. 
Despite  this problem,  we believe  that the benefits  of better capturing 
firm-specific investment incentives  outweigh the cost of increased mea- 
43.  Excluding those firms did not significantly affect the results. 
44.  For a summary of the standard construction,  see Auerbach and Hassett (1991) and 
Cummins and Hassett (1992). 
45.  Hulten and Wykoff (1981). 
46.  We experimented  with using Compustat data on the firms' S&P debt rating and 
bond rating as measures of the real interest rate firms face.  We opted to use the method 
above because  Compustat reports the debt and bond ratings only from 1978 onward. We 
believe  the class  of debt and bond rating may provide a better measure of a firm's real 
interest rate but did not find that using either measure in our sample after 1978 significantly 
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surement error. The relatively precise estimates reported below appear 
to justify this conclusion.47 
The construction  of tax-adjusted  q incorporates  the same improve- 
ments in calculating firm-specific depreciation. Otherwise, the construc- 
tion generally follows the work of Michael Salinger and Summers.48  The 
market value of equity is the sum of the market value of a firm's equity 
(defined as the common stock outstanding multiplied by the end-of-year 
common  stock price) and the market value of preferred stock (defined 
as the firm's preferred dividend payout divided by Standard and Poor's, 
S&P's, preferred dividend yield).49 The value of firm debt is the sum of 
short-term debt and long-term debt, both measured by their book val- 
ues. Replacement  values of inventories  and the capital stock are calcu- 
lated using the standard perpetual inventory method reported in appen- 
dix B. Data on expected  inflation are taken from the Livingston  Survey 
and are available from 1947 on.50  The value of the firm's required rate of 
return is calculated as the difference between the firm's interest rate and 
expected  inflation.5' Price deflators are obtained from Citibase. Tax pa- 
rameters are updated and corrected from those  used by Auerbach and 
Hassett; we construct asset-specific  investment tax credits to reflect the 
firm's two-digit SIC code asset composition.52 
Firm data were deleted or modified according to the following rules. 
If the estimated firm depreciation rate is negative or greater than unity, 
we set it equal to the mean for firms in the same four-digit SIC code.  If 
the estimated interest rate is above 25 percent, we also set it equal to the 
mean for firms in the  same  four-digit SIC code.53 If the replacement 
value of the capital stock or inventory is estimated to be negative, we set 
47.  The empirical results for the user cost experiments  presented in tables 8 and 9 in- 
clude firm-specific required rates of return. Estimates of models with a fixed required rate 
of return of 4 percent produced virtually identical results. 
48.  Salinger and Summers (1983). 
49.  S&P's preferred dividend yield is obtained from Citibase. 
50.  The Livingston  Survey data were provided by the Federal Reserve  Board, which 
maintains a data base of numerous macroeconomic  variables culled from many sources, 
including data on inflationary expectations  (as provided by the Livingston Survey). 
51.  When available, we use Compustat's S&P bond rating for the interest rate, and the 
associated  interest rate is obtained from Citibase; before  1978, the firm-specific interest 
rate is used. 
52.  Auerbach and Hassett (1991). 
53.  Alternatively,  the observations  were  deleted  without  significantly  affecting  the 
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it equal to book  value.  If dividend payouts  on preferred stock  are re- 
ported as missing, we set them equal to zero. If no inventory valuation 
method is specified, we assume the firm used the first in, first out (FIFO) 
system.  If multiple valuation methods are reported, our calculations as- 
sume that the primary method is used. 
We delete observations  if the ratio of investment to the beginning-of- 
period capital stock is greater than unity. We also delete observations  if 
the ratio of cash flow (or net income) to the beginning-of-period capital 
stock is greater than ten in absolute value. These two rules are intended 
to eliminate those observations  that represent especially  large mergers, 
extraordinary firm shocks, or Compustat coding errors. The rules delete 
less than 5 percent of the firms used in first-stage estimation. Finally, we 
delete observations  whose forecast  errors from the first stage are more 
than 20 times higher than the mean forecast  error. These  large forecast 
errors typically occur when there are very few observations for the firm, 
so that forecasting is very imprecise. Again, these rules eliminate a very 
small fraction of the data (usually about 1 percent of the firms and never 
more than 5 percent) of each year's sample. The results are not sensitive 
to which specific cutoff values are used. 
Results from Conventional  Estimation Approaches 
Before presenting our findings focusing on tax reforms, we begin by 
reporting results  from conventional  techniques  used  to estimate  neo- 
classical investment  models with convex  costs of adjustment. These es- 
timates provide a baseline against which to later compare estimates  us- 
ing our technique.  Table 3 provides  different sets  of estimates  for the 
tax-adjusted q model. In the first column, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
is used to estimate equation 5 with fixed firm and year effects.  Although 
statistically  significant, the estimated  coefficient  of 0.025 on Q is small 
and, as in previous studies, implies very high costs of adjustment.54  The 
specification  in the  second  column  follows  work  by  Steven  Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen,  as well as others,  adding cash flow rela- 
tive to the beginning-of-period capital stock (CF/K), where K is the be- 
ginning-of-period capital stock and CF denotes  before-tax  cash flow.55 
Both  estimated  coefficients  are positive  and precisely  estimated,  but 
again the small Q coefficient  implies large costs of adjustment. 
54.  See Summers (1981). 
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Table 3.  Basic Investment Equations: Tax-Adjusted q Model  a 
Model  featlure  OLS  GMM  OLSb  GMMb 
Inidepenidenit variable 
0.025  0.019  0.019  0.015  0.040  0.028  0.057  0.044 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Cash flow (CFIK)i,  .  ..  0.164  ...  0.154  .  ..  0.193  .  ..  0.344 
(0.005)  (0.026)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Instrumental 
variables  .  .  .  ..  Q  t-2  ,-3  ...  ...  QTi,,,  QO-2.1-3 
(11K)O,_  -,_  -  (11K)i,,-),  ,_3 
(CFIK)if  -,  , _ 3  (CFIK)i,  Y  2.Y  - 3 
Fixed  firm effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed  year  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
K2  00039  0.049  ...  .  .  0.068  0.127  .. 
X0',,_P)  ...  ...  13.18  11.75  . ..  .  .  .  500.46  448.98 
(p-value)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (7 x  10-  105)  (8 x  10-95) 
Number  of 
observations  19,855  19,855  18,729  18,399  18,168  18,168  18,129  17,973 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  Ii,/Ki,_1.  Variables  are  defined  in  the  text.  Standard  errors  on  coefficients,  in 
parentheses,  are computed  from a heteroscedastic-consistent  correlation  matrix. The regression  follows  equation  5 
in the text,  with the cash  flow variable added. 
b.  Regressions  are based on a differenced  version  of equation 5 as described  in the text. 
We report exercises  using generalized  method of moments  (GMM) 
estimates  in the third and fourth columns,  respectively.  Instrumental 
variables for Qi, are time t -  2 and t -  3 values of Q, I/K, and CF/K.56 
The tests  of the model's  overidentifying  restrictions  are also reported; 
each test is asymptotically  distributed as X2_-p)'  where n represents the 
number of instruments and p the number of parameters estimated.  The 
estimated coefficients  are similar to those  reported in the first two col- 
umns. The fifth and sixth columns  report results using a "two-period" 
differenced version of the models reported in the first two columns,  re- 
spectively,  following  work by Zvi Griliches and Jerry Hausman.s7 Al- 
though  the  estimated  coefficients  increase  somewhat  relative  to  the 
fixed-effects  OLS base case,  as one might expect  if measurement error 
is important, they still imply large costs of adjustment. The seventh and 
eighth columns report GMM estimates using second differences. 
To link the conventional  estimation strategy to our approach, we re- 
port in table 4 differenced estimates of a modified q model. Specifically, 
56.  We choose  a parsimonious instrument list.. Expansion of the instrument set to in- 
clude lags of other variables tended  to increase  power but had little effect  on the point 
estimates. 
57.  Griliches and Hausman (1986). By "two-period" differenced,  we mean the differ- 
ence  between  the period t and period t -  2 values of the variable. All of the differences 
reported in the text are for two periods. 00  660>  00 
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we equate the nontax components  of Qi,t with their t -  2 values, thereby 
forcing variation to reflect principally that variation arising from tax pa- 
rameters. We denote this new variable as QT. The first column reports 
OLS estimates with fixed firm and year effects.  The estimated QT coef- 
ficient increases substantially over the Q coefficient in the earlier regres- 
sions.  More dramatic differences  emerge when we estimate the model 
using cross-sectional  variation in the "major"  tax reform years, with es- 
timated QTcoefficients  ranging from 0.178 to 0.554, as shown in the sec- 
ond through fifth columns.  The remaining five columns repeat the exer- 
cises  just  described  using  GMM  estimates  of  the  differenced  tax- 
adjusted q model.  The results are qualitatively  similar to the OLS esti- 
mates. 
The results of the exercises  reported in tables 3 and 4 illustrate the 
potential significance of attempts to estimate investment models during 
periods  in which  major tax reforms provide  a discrete  change  in the 
cross-sectional  distribution of net returns to investment. 
Empirical  Results  in the Modified  Estimation  Approach 
In this section,  we provide empirical estimates for tax-adjusted q and 
user cost of capital specifications  with and without proxies for internal 
net worth-that  is, before-tax cash flow. We present, in turn, the results 
from estimating investment  equations that isolate the effects  of tax sur- 
prises on investment through the tax-adjusted q and user cost of capital 
models. 
Tax-Adjusted q Results 
Following equations 4 and 5, we estimate a model for each year:58 
(10)  (I,tKit  1) -  _  I ,t1 i,t_  A =- ,.i  a  fl  (Qi, 
- 
Qit  A 
Et 
58.  Note that we are ignoring the change in the nontax part of tax-adjusted q-that  is, 
in the financial market valuations embodied in q and in the price of investment goods,  p. 
We do this to focus on the cross-sectionally  exogenous  information from tax changes. This 
abstraction does not lead our estimated coefficients on tax-adjusted q to be biased upward. 
One concern might be that the introduction of an investment  incentive  would reduce the 
value of old capital in stock market valuations so that tax-adjusted q would move in a direc- 
tion opposite to F; marginal q would not be affected,  however.  Another concern might be 
that the price of investment  goods p would rise following  the introduction of investment 
incentives.  In this case,  our estimated  coefficient  on tax-adjusted q is biased downward. 
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where the variables with caret marks are firm-specific projections using 
period t -  2 information. To focus on the tax surprise, we set 
(11)  1qit-2  -  rit) 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for equation 10. We include years 
in which there was no tax reform as a control. By construction the coef- 
ficient on tax-adjusted q should be imprecisely  estimated  unless  there 
has been a tax reform. Years following a "major"  tax reform are denoted 
in the table by A; other tax reform years are denoted by K.  In each of the 
tax reform years,  we find that tax-adjusted q has a positive  and signifi- 
cant effect on investment.  In the nonreform years, we find no significant 
effect of tax-adjusted q on firm behavior. 
We argued in the introduction that we believe prior results presented 
point estimates of structural variables that were biased toward zero. The 
small  coefficients  reported  in previous  studies  implied  unreasonably 
large adjustment costs;  Summers'  preferred estimate  (which  summed 
the coefficients  on Q and lagged Q) implied that a one-dollar increase in 
investment  leads to between  one and five dollars of adjustment costs.59 
For most of the other results reported by Summers, the scale of the ad- 
justment cost is substantially larger than that of the purchase cost of the 
machine.  Our estimates  of the coefficient  on Q in table 5, which range 
from 0.874 to 0.470 following  the major reform years,  are an order of 
magnitude larger than those  reported in previous  studies.60 If one  ac- 
cepts the assumptions  underlying the Hayashi-Summers  approach, our 
estimates  suggest  that an extra dollar of investment  will add between 
0.05 and 0.12 dollar of adjustment costs.6' 
59.  Summers (1981). 
60.  See  Salinger and Summers  (1983),  Fazzari,  Hubbard, and Petersen  (1988), and 
Blundell and others (1992). 
61.  Interpretation of the size of the adjustment costs depends on the proximity of IIK 
to its steady-state  value. Near the steady state, most of investment is replacement invest- 
ment, which does  not incur any adjustment costs  in the model.  For the first few units of 
investment  over and above depreciation,  marginal adjustment costs  are low,  by the con- 
vexity assumption.  Far away from the steady state, marginal adjustment costs can be very 
high, even  given  our parameter estimates.  For the comparison  reported in the text,  we 
applied the sample means of the investment  to capital and depreciation  to capital ratios 
(0.18 and 0.13, respectively)  in order to gauge the relative adjustment costs. Jason  G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  31 
Table 5.  Investment Equations: Tax-Adjusted q Model for the Full Samplea 
Number 
Year  of firms  R2  Intercept  Q 
1963 A  251  0.056  -0.028  0.874 
(2.74)  (3.86) 
1964  362  0.000  0.044  0.011 
(3.13)  (0.06) 
1965 K  457  0.033  -0.020  0.742 
(1.27)  (3.95) 
1966  606  0.001  0.031  0.109 
(3.38)  (0.73) 
1967  636  0.000  0.030  0.002 
(2.83)  (0.02) 
1968 K  665  0.018  0.026  0.554 
(1.11)  (3.46) 
1969 K  682  0.028  0.028  0.607 
(1.12)  (4.44) 
1970 K  722  0.049  -0.030  0.533 
(4.14)  (6.10) 
1971 K  707  0.046  -0.085  0.494 
(9.09)  (5.81) 
1972 K  735  0.037  -  0.056  0.446 
(8.84)  (5.29) 
1973 A  828  0.029  -  0.046  0.470 
(6.64)  (4.97) 
1974  874  0.000  -  0.025  0.054 
(3.46)  (0.50) 
1975  959  0.002  -  0.068  -  0.119 
(10.87)  (1.28) 
1976 K  1007  0.037  -0.003  0.515 
(0.61)  (6.23) 
1977  1046  0.001  0.055  0.074 
(9.96)  (0.79) 
1978  1063  0.001  0.065  0.080 
(10.22)  (0.81) 
1979  1077  0.002  0.026  0.138 
(3.37)  (1.41) 
1980 K  1081  0.024  -0.003  0.491 
(0.51)  (5.15) 
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Table 5  (continued) 
Niumber 
Year  of firms  R'  Intercept  Q 
1981  1103  0.001  -  0.022  0.088 
(3.77)  (0.83) 
1982 A  1114  0.030  -0.026  0.599 
(5.07)  (5.84) 
1983 K  1130  0.023  -0.004  0.609 
(0.74)  (5.85) 
1984  1136  0.000  0.028  -  0.020 
(3.43)  (0.20) 
1985  1160  0.001  0.032  0.085 
(4.15)  (0.83) 
1986  1188  0.001  0.021  0.105 
(2.50)  (1.14) 
1987 A  1250  0.034  -  0.026  0.613 
(3.18)  (6.66) 
1988  1294  0.001  -  0.030  0.127 
(1.15)  (1.32) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  I,,/K,,_,.  HIeteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes,  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
Table 6 reports coefficient  estimates  for the same model for sample 
firms in the manufacturing sector (SIC codes 20-39).  We provide this de- 
composition  both to evaluate whether our results are merely reflecting 
variation across one-digit industries and to compare our results to other 
studies that focus on the manufacturing sector. Again, we find the coef- 
ficient on tax-adjusted q is statistically  and economically  significant in 
years immediately following a major tax reform. For the manufacturing 
sector, estimated adjustment costs  are even smaller than for the sample 
as a whole,  which is entirely plausible since the manufacturing capital 
stock is relatively more equipment intensive than other sectors. 
Table 7 provides two sets of results for each year. The first augments 
the tax-adjusted q model to include a twice-lagged  ratio of cash flow to 
capital.62  The inclusion of this variable allows us to check the sensitivity 
62.  This follows  Fazzari,  Hubbard, and Petersen  (1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
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Table 6.  Investment Equations: Tax-Adjusted q Model for the Manufacturing Sectora 
Number 
Year  of firms  R2  Intercept  Q 
1963 A  225  0.088  0.017  1.190 
(1.41)  (4.62) 
1964  298  0.001  0.051  0.085 
(3.28)  (0.42) 
1965 K  317  0.036  -0.002  0.868 
(0.08)  (3.42) 
1966  354  0.003  0.037  0.251 
(2.72)  (1.07) 
1967  371  0.001  0.037  0.181 
(2.39)  (0.62) 
1968 K  378  0.032  0.027  0.651 
(0.90)  (3.51) 
1969 K  388  0.030  0.008  0.604 
(0.28)  (3.45) 
1970 K  416  0.034  -0.031  0.555 
(2.39)  (3.84) 
1971 K  394  0.053  -0.058  0.650 
(5.50)  (4.66) 
1972 K  436  0.040  -0.038  0.639 
(4.61)  (4.24) 
1973 A  493  0.031  -0.023  0.537 
(2.83)  (3.93) 
1974  506  0.002  -  0.001  0.170 
(1.27)  (1.00) 
1975  527  0.001  -  0.070  0.125 
(6.71)  (0.72) 
1976 K  549  0.042  -0.015  0.588 
(2.11)  (4.80) 
1977  565  0.003  0.035  0.155 
(5.09)  (1.20) 
1978  590  0.001  0.065  0.133 
(7.81)  (0.92) 
1979  597  0.002  0.035  0.168 
(2.86)  (0.93) 
1980 K  606  0.027  0.015  0.577 
(2.10)  (4.07) 
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Table 6  (continued) 
Number 
Year  of firms  R2  Intercept  Q 
1981  610  0.001  -0.021  0.118 
(2.48)  (0.72) 
1982 A  628  0.023  -0.034  0.593 
(4.35)  (3.79) 
1983 K  634  0.028  -0.016  0.645 
(1.92)  (4.23) 
1984  644  0.001  0.030  0.072 
(2.60)  (0.49) 
1985  660  0.001  0.038  0.139 
(3.42)  (0.94) 
1986  680  0.002  0.010  0.196 
(0.69)  (1.23) 
1987 A  706  0.027  -0.030  0.661 
(3.26)  (4.39) 
1988  722  0.001  -  0.038  0.160 
(0.80)  (0.91) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  Ii,1Ki,_I.  Heteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes.  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
of the tax-adjusted q coefficients  against our assumption that cross-sec- 
tional variation in internal funds does not materially affect the ability to 
estimate policy changes through tax-adjusted q. Although the estimated 
cash  flow coefficient  is positive  and statistically  significant (as in the 
studies cited above), it does not qualitatively change the point estimates 
on tax-adjusted q. This coefficient  implies that the cash flow innovation 
in the period prior to the reform helps predict today's  investment  over 
and above beginning-of-period tax-adjusted q. 
The second  equation reported for each year includes  an interaction 
term, denoted ND, between a dummy variable for paying zero dividends 
and the cash flow term. The dummy variable is one if the firm paid no 
dividends in period t -  2 and zero if the firm paid a dividend in period 
t -  2. As noted previously by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, the vari- 
ation across firms of the sensitivity of investment to tax-adjusted q, com- 
bined with ex ante information as to which firms are most likely to be 
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Table 7.  Investment Equations: Tax-Adjusted q and Cash Flow for the Full Sample  a 
Year  R2  Intercept  Q  CFIKb  NDC 
1963 A  0.117  -0.030  0.717  0.143  .  .  . 
(1.99)  (3.13)  (4.14) 
0.117  -  0.030  0.717  0.143  -0.004 
(1.98)  (3.11)  (4.02)  (0.03) 
1964  0.058  0.016  0.115  0.150  ... 
(0.84)  (0.65)  (4.47) 
0.060  0.019  0.097  0.137  0.071 
(0.98)  (0.54)  (3.68)  (0.81) 
1965 K  0.073  -0.018  0.661  0.122  .  .  . 
(0.91)  (3.37)  (4.56) 
0.075  -  0.020  0.663  0.137  -  0.053 
(0.99)  (3.38)  (4.33)  (0.88) 
1966  0.068  0.022  0.042  0.151  .  .  . 
(2.61)  (0.32)  (6.55) 
0.071  0.021  0.049  0.167  -  0.064 
(2.47)  (0.37)  (6.30)  (1.19) 
1967  0.160  0.028  -  0.034  0.243  . 
(1.38)  (0.22)  (11.11) 
0.167  0.029  -  0.027  0.221  0.140 
(1.44)  (0.18)  (9.30)  (2.35) 
1968 K  0.118  0.022  0.391  0.200  .  .  . 
(0.94)  (3.12)  (8.26) 
0.120  0.019  0.380  0.183  0.074 
(0.82)  (3.03)  (7.10)  (1.38) 
1969 K  0.141  -0.034  0.335  0.166  .  .  . 
(2.70)  (4.07)  (9.23) 
0.142  -  0.034  0.339  0.174  -  0.045 
(2.67)  (4.12)  (8.86)  (1.04) 
1970 K  0.128  -  0.014  0.417  0.135  .  .  . 
(1.49)  (5.87)  (7.87) 
0.131  -  0.014  0.413  0.155  -  0.052 
(1.52)  (5.83)  (7.10)  (1.47) 
1971 K  0.224  -0.040  0.337  0.168 
(5.07)  (4.70)  (12.54) 
0.235  -  0.039  0.350  0.137  0.087 
(4.92)  (4.91)  (8.31)  (3.22) 
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Table 7  (continued) 
Year  R2  Intercept  Q  CFIKb  NDc 
1972 K  0.147  -  0.044  0.340  0.155  ... 
(6.39)  (5.33)  (9.36) 
0.147  -  0.044  0.338  0.158  -  0.012 
(6.36)  (5.27)  (8.09)  (0.35) 
1973 A  0.134  -0.050  0.325  0.111  .  .  . 
(6.48)  (4.62)  (10.25) 
0.136  -0.051  0.326  0.121  -0.027 
(6.52)  (4.64)  (8.88)  (1.19) 
1974  0.163  -  0.028  -  0.068  0.180  .  .  . 
(3.96)  (0.85)  (13.08) 
0.178  -0.024  -0.057  0.151  0.138 
(3.45)  (0.71)  (9.87)  (4.00) 
1975  0.121  -  0.070  0.083  0.147  .  .  . 
(13.06)  (1.15)  (11.37) 
0.117  -0.068  0.065  0.131  0.139 
(12.81)  (0.90)  (9.57)  (3.46) 
1976 K  0.136  -0.014  0.359  0.146  .  .  . 
(2.68)  (5.34)  (10.77) 
0.137  -  0.014  0.359  0.158  -  0.031 
(2.72)  (5.34)  (9.09)  (1.12) 
1977  0.102  0.041  -  0.016  0.137  .  .  . 
(6.90)  (0.21)  (10.80) 
0.102  0.041  -  0.015  0.135  0.006 
(6.90)  (0.20)  (8.88)  (0.23) 
1978  0.105  0.054  -  0.071  0.158  . 
(8.39)  (0.82)  (11.11) 
0.105  0.053  0.070  0.165  -  0.025 
(8.26)  (0.82)  (9.89)  (0.80) 
1979  0.089  0.035  -  0.042  0.130  .  .  . 
(4.25)  (0.39)  (10.20) 
0.090  0.034  -  0.040  0.141  -  0.036 
(4.14)  (0.37)  (9.21)  (1.30) 
1980 K  0.108  -  0.001  0.404  0.124  . .  . 
(1.07)  (4.63)  (9.88) 
0.108  -  0.001  0.404  0.123  0.004 
(1.07)  (4.63)  (8.40)  (0.15) 
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Table 7  (continued) 
Year  R2  Intercept  Q  CFIKb  NDC 
1981  0.091  -0.013  -0.137  0.139  ... 
(2.27)  (1.38)  (10.44) 
0.098  -  0.015  -  0.122  0.128  0.151 
(2.53)  (1.23)  (9.32)  (2.82) 
1982 A  0.158  -  0.000  0.327  0.187  .  .  . 
(0.041)  (3.61)  (13.67) 
0.164  -0.001  0.321  0.163  0.081 
(0.11)  (3.55)  (9.98)  (2.79) 
1983 K  0.107  0.021  0.418  0.129  .  .  . 
(3.94)  (4.42)  (10.25) 
0.108  0.022  0.425  0.141  -  0.032 
(4.06)  (4.49)  (9.00)  (1.26) 
1984  0.099  0.037  0.052  0.147  .  .  . 
(6.09)  (0.54)  (11.09) 
0.101  0.037  0.053  0.164  -  0.043 
(6.09)  (0.54)  (9.85)  (1.54) 
1985  0.113  0.036  -0.029  0.151  ... 
(6.17)  (0.32)  (12.03) 
0.115  0.035  -0.028  0.167  -0.037 
(5.98)  (0.31)  (10.05)  (1.48) 
1986  0.085  0.032  0.062  0.119  .  . . 
(4.95)  (0.70)  (10.31) 
0.085  0.032  0.060  0.116  0.005 
(4.95)  (0.68)  (7.57)  (0.24) 
1987 A  0.107  -0.014  0.461  0.111  .  .  . 
(1.73)  (6.01)  (9.80) 
0.107  -  0.014  0.457  0.107  0.010 
(1.69)  (5.93)  (7.11)  (0.46) 
1988  0.053  0.011  0.017  0.087  .  .  . 
(0.73)  (0.20)  (8.28) 
0.053  0.011  0.016  0.091  -  0.006 
(0.74)  (0.19)  (5.86)  (0.31) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  Ii,1Ki,_I.  Heteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes,  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
b.  Cash flow variable. 
c.  ND  denotes  the no-dividend  interaction term, nodii'dunzi,_,  x  CFIK, where nodiv'durn  equals 0 if firm pays a 
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firms' net worth on investment.63 If the availability of internal funds is 
not important, and the cash coefficient isjust capturing misspecification, 
then the coefficient  on the interaction term should be zero.  In fact, the 
coefficient  on this term is not always zero but follows  a clearly discern- 
ible pattern: investment  by non-dividend  paying firms is much more 
sensitive  to cash  flow during recessions.64 This  cyclical  sensitivity  is 
consistent  with  the  models  of  Gertler and  Hubbard and of  Stephen 
Oliner and Glenn Rudebusch,  in which net worth constrains investment 
in downturns, but not in booms.65 
Finally, table 8 reports coefficient  estimates for the same model as in 
table 7 for a sample restricted to manufacturing firms. As with the basic 
Q model, the results closely  match those for the sample as a whole. 
User Cost of Capital Results 
The user cost  of capital and tax-adjusted q formulations are derived 
from the same model of firm investment,  and one should expect that esti- 
mation of either model would imply similar adjustment costs.  In fact, 
estimated coefficients  on q have tended to be uniformly small, while esti- 
mated coefficients  on the user cost  of capital have varied significantly 
across studies. As a further check of our approach, we report in this sec- 
tion our estimates  of the user cost  of capital model (equation 4). If we 
are indeed measuring the "true" structural explanatory variables of in- 
vestment,  then our estimated  adjustment costs  using the user cost  of 
capital model should be consistent  with those  reported for the tax-ad- 
justed q representation in the previous section. In theory, the coefficient 
on the user cost of capital is equal to that on tax-adjusted q, divided by 
the expected  value of the user cost term.66 
Table 9 reports our estimates of equation 9 (using the full sample) for 
the basic user cost of capital model for equipment investment described 
earlier. The estimated  coefficient  on the fundamental variable is large 
and statistically significant in the years just following a major tax reform 
63.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). 
64.  The only year that contradicts this statement is 1967, but this was the year of the 
post-Regulation  Q "credit crunch." See Gertler and Hubbard (1988). 
65.  Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1994). 
66.  Under constant returns to scale and perfect competition,  the coefficient is equal to 
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Table 8.  Investment Equations: Tax-Adjusted q and Cash Flow for the Manufacturing 
Sector  a 
Year  R'  Intercept  Q  CFIKb  NDC 
1963 A  0.237  -  0.020  0.927  0.170 
(1.16)  (3.67)  (6.27) 
0.237  -0.021  0.929  0.173  -  0.022 
(1.17)  (3.67)  (6.02)  (0.26) 
1964  0.123  0.029  0.074  0.180  ... 
(1.41)  (0.40)  (6.29) 
0.124  0.030  0.072  0.171  0.038 
(1.46)  (0.39)  (5.20)  (0.56) 
1965 K  0.064  -0.004  0.764  0.093  . 
(0.21)  (3.10)  (2.96) 
0.067  -  0.003  0.768  0.079  0.086 
(0.11)  (3.12)  (2.29)  (0.95) 
1966  0.103  0.034  0.102  0.178  .  .  . 
(2.75)  (0.50)  (6.25) 
0.104  0.032  0.118  0.187  -0.043 
(2.57)  (0.58)  (5.83)  (0.61) 
1967  0.191  0.046  0.143  0.225  . 
(1.64)  (0.66)  (9.29) 
0.208  0.049  0.153  0.193  0.178 
(1.74)  (0.71)  (7.30)  (2.85) 
1968 K  0.150  0.008  0.488  0.159  .  .  . 
(0.22)  (3.04)  (7.43) 
0.155  0.002  0.477  0.137  0.072 
(0.11)  (2.98)  (5.30)  (1.55) 
1969 K  0.113  -0.046  0.472  0.120  . 
(2.51)  (4.31)  (5.35) 
0.114  -  0.045  0.474  0.129  -  0.037 
(2.48)  (4.31)  (5.04)  (0.76) 
1970 K  0.132  -0.019  0.409  0.137  . 
(1.00)  (3.31)  (7.03) 
0.132  -  0.019  0.409  0.135  0.005 
(1.00)  (3.30)  (5.47)  (0.14) 
1971 K  0.201  -0.052  0.323  0.149  .  .  . 
(3.82)  (3.12)  (9.08) 
0.213  -  0.049  0.345  0.122  0.086 
(3.61)  (3.34)  (6.28)  (2.52) 
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Table 8  (continued) 
Year  R2  Inter  cept  Q  CF/Kb  NDC 
1972 K  0.127  -  0.043  0.460  0.143  ... 
(5.20)  (3.92)  (6.86) 
0.128  -  0.043  0.454  0.149  -  0.025 
(5.19)  (3.83)  (6.32)  (0.54) 
1973 A  0.169  -  0.039  0.545  0.111  . 
(4.25)  (4.88)  (8.45) 
0.169  -0.039  0.545  0.115  -0.011 
(4.27)  (4.88)  (6.72)  (0.43) 
1974  0.274  -  0.037  0.111  0.229  .  .  . 
(4.62)  (0.88)  (13.71) 
0.292  -  0.032  0.101  0.198  0.148 
(3.87)  (0.81)  (10.60)  (3.51) 
1975  0.206  -  0.092  0.018  0.204  .  .  . 
(12.43)  (0.17)  (11.63) 
0.228  -0.092  0.007  0.185  0.249 
(12.42)  (0.06)  (10.25)  (3.81) 
1976 K  0.161  -  0.018  0.467  0.152  .  .  . 
(2.89)  (4.08)  (9.16) 
0.162  -  0.018  0.465  0.162  -  0.028 
(2.91)  (4.06)  (7.95)  (0.81) 
1977  0.080  0.020  -  0.007  0.113  .  .  . 
(2.77)  (0.06)  (6.95) 
0.081  0.020  -  0.017  0.121  -  0.025 
(2.73)  (0.14)  (6.24)  (0.71) 
1978  0.127  0.037  0.068  0.149  .  .  . 
(4.18)  (0.53)  (9.13) 
0.130  0.036  0.049  0.165  -0.049 
(4.12)  (0.38)  (8.39)  (1.44) 
1979  0.089  0.038  -  0.010  0.134  .  .  . 
(3.42)  (0.06)  (7.55) 
0.089  0.038  -  0.010  0.135  -  0.006 
(3.37)  (0.06)  (6.34)  (0.16) 
1980 K  0.092  0.008  0.471  0.111  .  .  . 
(1.18)  (3.62)  (6.55) 
0.094  0.008  0.466  0.122  -  0.039 
(1.16)  (3.58)  (6.13)  (1.03) 
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Table 8  (continued) 
Year  R2  Intercept  Q  CFIKb  NDC 
1981  0.145  -0.013  -0.126  0.172  ... 
(1.65)  (0.82)  (10.14) 
0.154  -0.011  -0.086  0.150  0.097 
(1.46)  (0.56)  (7.89)  (2.44) 
1982 A  0.181  -0.012  0.439  0.182  ... 
(1.32)  (3.11)  (10.87) 
0.196  -0.011  0.443  0.150  0.131 
(1.30)  (3.17)  (7.91)  (3.50) 
1983 K  0.107  0.008  0.453  0.148  ... 
(1.05)  (3.14)  (8.37) 
0.125  0.009  0.462  0.157  -  0.025 
(1.13)  (3.19)  (7.21)  (0.71) 
1984  0.139  0.046  0.095  0.167  ... 
(5.19)  (0.70)  (10.05) 
0.139  0.046  0.093  0.174  -0.016 
(5.19)  (0.68)  (8.27)  (0.45) 
1985  0.153  0.042  0.064  0.158  .  .  . 
(5.25)  (0.48)  (10.66) 
0.154  0.040  0.070  0.173  -0.031 
(5.02)  (0.52)  (8.53)  (1.05) 
1986  0.076  0.036  0.020  0.131  .  .  . 
(2.94)  (0.12)  (7.40) 
0.080  0.036  0.015  0.111  0.054 
(2.95)  (0.10)  (5.04)  (1.47) 
1987 A  0.117  -0.015  0.543  0.133  .  .  . 
(0.96)  (3.51)  (8.61) 
0.119  -  0.016  0.547  0.120  0.028 
(0.98)  (3.53)  (5.81)  (0.93) 
1988  0.059  0.016  0.007  0.096  ... 
(0.52)  (0.04)  (6.69) 
0.059  0.015  0.006  0.097  -0.002 
(0.52)  (0.04)  (4.54)  (0.08) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  1i,Ki,,_1.  Heteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes,  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
b.  Cash flow variable. 
c.  ND  denotes  the no-dividend  interaction term, nodivdurnz,2  x  CFIK, where niodivdum,tl  equals 0 if firm pays a 
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Table 9.  Equipment Investment Equations: Cost of Capital Model for the Full Sample  a 
Number 
of  User 
Year  observations  R2  Intercept  cost 
1963 A  107  0.145  -  0.078  -  0.605 
(2.72)  (4.21) 
1964  136  0.001  0.041  0.024 
(3.78)  (0.33) 
1965 K  150  0.087  0.010  -0.691 
(0.58)  (3.74) 
1966  294  0.000  0.057  0.044 
(2.34)  (0.26) 
1967  305  0.002  0.046  -0.129 
(1.91)  (0.72) 
1968 K  335  0.044  -0.000  -0.506 
(0.02)  (3.93) 
1969 K  144  0.067  -0.254  -0.711 
(5.17)  (3.21) 
1970 K  197  0.058  -0.053  -0.499 
(3.21)  (3.47) 
1971 K  138  0.064  -0.037  -0.632 
(0.58)  (3.05) 
1972 K  241  0.043  0.004  -0.654 
(0.28)  (3.29) 
1973 A  267  0.057  0.024  -0.546 
(1.32)  (4.00) 
1974  291  0.005  -  0.019  0.188 
(1.20)  (1.19) 
1975  441  0.001  -  0.055  0.104 
(5.05)  (0.66) 
1976 K  574  0.050  -0.045  -0.680 
(3.89)  (5.51) 
1977  641  0.000  0.076  0.040 
(7.77)  (0.29) 
1978  670  0.004  0.065  0.219 
(6.82)  (1.60) 
1979  682  0.002  0.032  0.167 
(3.53)  (1.14) 
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Table 9  (continued) 
Number 
of  User 
Year  observations  R2  Intercept  cost 
1980 K  687  0.040  0.039  -0.610 
(2.92)  (5.33) 
1981  452  0.002  -  0.010  0.205 
(0.90)  (1.05) 
1982 A  469  0.032  -  0.047  -  0.757 
(5.06)  (3.89) 
1983 K  512  0.019  -  0.047  -  0.829 
(4.21)  (3.18) 
1984  520  0.000  0.017  -  0.066 
(1.76)  (0.35) 
1985  524  0.000  0.056  -  0.015 
(5.53)  (0.08) 
1986  532  0.004  0.023  0.286 
(0.74)  (1.43) 
1987 A  549  0.022  0.012  -0.747 
(0.74)  (3.32) 
1988  573  0.004  -  0.068  0.296 
(3.58)  (1.52) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  1i,1Ki,_1.  Heteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes,  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
and insignificant in nonreform years. The mean of the coefficients  over 
the 13 tax reform years is about  -  0.65. Since the mean of our user cost 
of capital is about 0.25, these results roughly correspond to a coefficient 
on tax-adjusted q of 0.16. In terms of the structural parameters, this im- 
plies that an extra dollar of investment  will lead to about 0.30 dollar of 
additional adjustment costs.  Because we study equipment investment in 
this case-as  opposed  to total investment  in the tax-adjusted q setup- 
the coefficient estimates are not strictly comparable.67  Nonetheless,  the 
coefficient  estimates  on tax-adjusted q and the user cost  of capital are 
67.  Also at issue may well be the assumption of perfect competition required to make 
the comparison. In the case of monopolistic  competition, for example, the estimated value 
of k should fall relative to the perfectly  competitive  case.  As a result, it may appear that 
estimated adjustment costs  are larger in the user cost specification than in the q specifica- 
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much larger than those reported by previous studies, and both are in an 
intuitively reasonable range.68 
As we did for the tax-adjusted q model, we also investigate  whether 
the inclusion of cash flow variables significantly alters the estimated ef- 
fect of the user cost of capital on investment.  The result of this experi- 
ment is reported in table 10. As we found in the tax-adjusted q model, 
lagged cash flow is positively  correlated with investment,  and this effect 
is  most  pronounced  for  non-dividend  paying  firms during economic 
downturns.  The inclusion  of this additional variable does  not qualita- 
tively alter the coefficients  on the user cost of capital, however. 
Some Additional Considerations 
In this section,  we discuss  other related evidence.  We then proceed 
to relate our results to past empirical work and to the recently developed 
models of irreversible investment. 
Evidence from  International  Data 
An additional check  on the usefulness  of our approach of using tax 
reforms as natural experiments is to estimate investment models similar 
to equations 5 and 10 for other countries.  We believe  it is important to 
compare the robustness of our results based on U.S.  micro data to those 
based on micro data from other industrial countries (members of the Or- 
ganization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  or OECD). In 
addition, however,  OECD countries  provide a more varied laboratory 
for analyzing business fixed investment.  The institutional environment, 
capital  market  imperfections,  and  tax  changes  that  firms face  vary 
across countries, potentially allowing richer conclusions  to be drawn. 
In previous  work,  we  conducted  such  tests  for the tax-adjusted  q 
model using panel data from the Global Vantage data base.69 We pro- 
vided  results for a group of industrial countries-Australia,  Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, the  Netherlands, 
68.  Similar results were obtained using the manufacturing sample but are not reported 
here. 
69.  See Cummins, Hassett,  and Hubbard (1994). Global Vantage is a Compustat-like 
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Table 10.  Equipment Investment Equations: Cost of Capital and Cash Flow 
for the Full Sample  a 
User 
Year  R2  Intercept  cost  CF/Kb  NDc 
1963 A  0.267  -  0.074  -  0.503  0.104 
(2.75)  (3.70)  (4.17) 
0.274  -0.073  -0.494  0.101  0.152 
(2.73)  (3.63)  (4.02)  (0.96) 
1964  0.160  0.020  -  0.029  0.098 
(2.41)  (0.43)  (5.01) 
0.166  0.026  -0.030  0.101  -0.135 
(2.46)  (0.44)  (5.10)  (1.00) 
1965 K  0.197  0.001  -0.702  0.100 
(0.07)  (4.04)  (4.49) 
0.197  0.002  -  0.694  0.096  0.017 
(0.141)  (3.95)  (3.69)  (0.33) 
1966  0.114  0.028  -0.104  0.131  ... 
(1.15)  (0.66)  (6.11) 
0.115  0.028  -0.103  0.127  0.019 
(1.15)  (0.65)  (5.42)  (0.35) 
1967  0.164  0.048  -0.122  0.156  ... 
(2.18)  (0.75)  (7.66) 
0.206  0.043  -  0.106  0.118  0.203 
(1.97)  (0.66)  (5.34)  (3.97) 
1968 K  0.077  0.004  -0.484  0.074  . 
(0.21)  (3.82)  (3.43) 
0.077  0.004  -  0.484  0.075  -  0.003 
(0.21)  (3.81)  (2.84)  (0.06) 
1969 K  0.104  -0.217  -0.612  0.102  . 
(4.27)  (2.76)  (2.39) 
0.104  -  0.217  -  0.610  0.110  -  0.023 
(4.62)  (2.74)  (2.12)  (0.27) 
1970 K  0.139  -0.048  -0.422  0.096 
(2.98)  (3.04)  (4.26) 
0.139  -  0.047  -  0.421  0.091  0.016 
(2.92)  (3.03)  (3.27)  (0.33) 
1971 K  0.340  0.069  -0.505  0.124  .  .  . 
(1.29)  (2.87)  (7.51) 
0.359  0.065  -  0.484  0.097  0.060 
(1.23)  (2.78)  (4.58)  (2.04) 
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Table 10  (continued) 
User 
Year  R2  Intercept  cost  CFIKb  NDc 
1972 K  0.195  0.010  -0.555  0.100  ... 
(0.77)  (3.03)  (6.69) 
0.203  0.011  -0.571  0.084  0.048 
(0.90)  (3.12)  (4.64)  (1.42) 
1973 A  0.091  -0.030  -0.540  0.073 
(1.72)  (4.03)  (3.16) 
0.092  -  0.030  -0.538  0.070  0.008 
(1.70)  (3.99)  (2.40)  (0.16) 
1974  0.196  -  0.018  0.042  0.118 
(1.27)  (0.29)  (8.26) 
0.232  -0.014  0.043  0.079  0.107 
(0.98)  (0.31)  (4.50)  (3.71) 
1975  0.114  -  0.072  0.030  0.101  .  .  . 
(6.80)  (0.20)  (7.47) 
0.135  -  0.072  -  0.018  0.074  0.095 
(6.92)  (0.20)  (4.72)  (3.27) 
1976 K  0.159  -  0.027  -  0.591  0.075  .  . . 
(2.42)  (5.06)  (8.57) 
0.159  -  0.026  -  0.583  0.080  -  0.011 
(2.37)  (4.96)  (6.82)  (0.63) 
1977  0.057  0.060  -  0.048  0.058  .  .  . 
(6.09)  (0.36)  (6.19) 
0.059  0.059  -  0.053  0.066  -  0.023 
(5.98)  (0.39)  (5.75)  (1.23) 
1978  0.102  0.042  0.124  0.085  .  .  . 
(4.51)  (0.96)  (8.52) 
0.102  0.043  0.126  0.083  0.006 
(4.51)  (0.97)  (7.14)  (0.27) 
1979  0.105  0.026  0.187  0.086  . 
(2.94)  (1.34)  (8.82) 
0.105  0.026  0.189  0.088  -0.007 
(2.93)  (1.35)  (7.55)  (0.33) 
1980 K  0.109  0.037  -  0.570  0.069  .  .  . 
(2.87)  (5.16)  (7.30) 
0.110  0.037  -  0.572  0.064  0.019 
(2.89)  (5.17)  (5.93)  (0.84) 
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Table 10  (continued) 
User 
Year  R2  Intercept  cost  CF/Kb  NDc 
1981  0.143  -0.001  0.290  0.136 
(0.11)  (1.59)  (8.56) 
0.152  -0.004  0.290  0.112  0.076 
(0.37)  (1.60)  (5.81)  (2.22) 
1982 A  0.155  -0.026  -0.632  0.111  ... 
(2.87)  (3.46)  (8.18) 
0.170  -0.029  -  0.643  0.079  0.078 
(3.24)  (3.55)  (4.51)  (3.00) 
1983 K  0.098  -0.018  -  0.620  0.088 
(1.58)  (2.46)  (6.66) 
0.103  -0.016  -0.587  0.103  -0.044 
(1.41)  (2.32)  (6.44)  (1.61) 
1984  0.105  0.027  -0.063  0.086  ... 
(2.94)  (0.36)  (7.77) 
0.105  0.027  -0.065  0.084  0.007 
(2.94)  (0.37)  (6.24)  (0.32) 
1985  0.097  0.051  -  0.009  0.083  .  .  . 
(5.22)  (0.05)  (7.49) 
0.097  0.051  -0.009  0.081  0.005 
(5.18)  (0.05)  (5.48)  (0.22) 
1986  0.095  0.006  0.089  0.083  ... 
(0.20)  (0.46)  (7.31) 
0.096  0.006  0.086  0.077  0.017 
(0.20)  (0.45)  (5.48)  (0.74) 
1987 A  0.081  0.023  -0.722  0.071  .  .  . 
(1.52)  (3.30)  (5.58) 
0.084  0.025  -  0.729  0.085  -  0.034 
(1.61)  (3.34)  (5.22)  (1.35) 
1988  0.113  -  0.059  0.240  0.094  .  .  . 
(3.29)  (1.31)  (8.33) 
0.113  -0.059  0.249  0.098  -0.011 
(3.30)  (1.35)  (6.70)  (0.46) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  i,,Ki,,_1  Heteroscedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  A and  K  denote 
years following  major and minor tax changes,  respectively.  See  text for descriptions. 
b.  Cash flow variable. 
c.  ND  denotes  the no-dividend  interaction term,  nodiivdumi;,-,  x  CFIK, where nodis'dum equals 0 if firm pays a 
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Norway,  Spain, Sweden,  and the United Kingdom-analogous  to those 
we present here for the United States.  For each country,  we found im- 
plausibly large adjustment costs using traditional techniques.  Estimated 
coefficients  on tax-adjusted q averaged about 0.05 when we used OLS 
or GMM with fixed firm and year effects.  Focusing on the years in which 
there  were  significant tax  reforms,  we  estimated  much  larger coeffi- 
cients on tax-adjusted q, implying smaller adjustment costs  than those 
conventionally  estimated.  For most  countries  these  coefficients  were 
similar to those reported here for the United States, averaging about 0.7 
for the many countries in our sample. 
Comparison  with Euler Equation Estimates 
The argument that we are estimating structural parameters depends 
crucially on one'sjudgment  about the validity of our identifying assump- 
tion that there are times  when  we  can observe  the relevant  expected 
structural variable. If our assumption is accurate, and our estimates are 
capturing adjustment cost parameters, those estimates  should not vary 
significantly over time and specification.  Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel 
have shown that Euler equation estimates of the adjustment cost param- 
eters presented here can vary over time by a factor of ten.70  By contrast, 
our estimates vary over a much smaller range and are economically  simi- 
lar across different econometric  specifications  of the same basic model 
over a 27-year period. 
Consideration  of Changes  in the Price  of Capital Goods 
Our technique  for  analyzing  the  responsiveness  of  investment  to 
changes in the net return to investing relies on contemporaneous  tax in- 
formation, holding nontax components  of structural variables constant 
at their pretax reform values. As a result, the estimated effect of changes 
in tax-adjusted  q and the user cost  of capital do not incorporate addi- 
tional contemporaneous  effects  of a tax-induced  shock  to investment 
demand on the prices of investment goods (if the marginal cost for sup- 
plying investment  were  increasing,  for example).  The response  of the 
value  of investment  expenditures  to a change  in the net return to in- 
70.  Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (forthcoming-b). Jason G. Clummins,  Kevin  A. Hassett, and  R. Glenn  Hubbard  49 
vesting  will be  larger than our implied effects  if there  are significant 
short-term price effects of an increase in investment demand. Analyzing 
this channel is a topic for future research.7' 
Comparison  with Irreversible Investment  Models 
According  to our setup,  firms always  respond to fundamentals in a 
manner consistent  with  the  neoclassical  model;  the  problem  for  the 
econometrician  is  that recovering  "reasonable"  estimates  is  possible 
only during periods in which large exogenous  changes in the cross-sec- 
tional distribution of the structural determinants occur, as during tax re- 
forms.  Given our results,  some might argue that we have documented 
that firms respond only to changes in fundamentals when these changes 
are large-that  is,  our results  are consistent  with the predictions  of a 
model  of  irreversible  investment.72 Under  this  line  of  argument,  the 
problem is not that the neoclassical  optimizing behavior cannot be esti- 
mated using conventional  techniques  but that the  neoclassical  model 
with convex  adjustment costs  is not a reasonable  description  of firm's 
decisions.  At an intuitive level,  it is not difficult to suggest examples  of 
nonconvex  adjustment costs  (such as retooling in automobile plants or 
the  adoption  of  more  energy-efficient  kilns  in cement  plants).  Mark 
Doms and Timothy Dunne examine more systematically  changes in cap- 
ital stocks at the plant level using a large data set drawn from the Longi- 
tudinal Research  data base maintained by the Bureau of the Census.73 
Doms and Dunne find that 25 percent of expenditures on new equipment 
and structures is made by (generally small) plants that increase real capi- 
tal stocks by more than 30 percent in a given year. However,  they report 
that 80 percent of plants, accounting for 45 percent of total investment, 
change their real capital stocks by less than 10 percent in a given year. 
Using our firm-level data from Compustat, we examine whether firms 
concentrate  investment  spending in periods  of significant shifts in the 
71.  For one attempt at so doing, see Goolsbee  (1994), who studies the investment  tax 
credit in isolation. 
72.  Models of irreversible investment  under uncertainty stress the importance of the 
option value of delaying investment  in order to obtain new information about a project's 
cost or value. Because investment is assumed to be reversible in the conventional neoclas- 
sical model,  and firms cannot  delay exercising  their option  to invest,  this complication 
does not arise. 
73.  Doms and Dunne (1993). 50  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
net return to investing.  Figure 8 illustrates changes in investment to be- 
ginning-of-period capital stock ratios (IIK) in 1986, 1987, and 1988 (the 
year the Tax Reform Act of  1986 was enacted and the subsequent  two 
years).  The  four column  blocks  represent  firms' values  of I/K in the 
given year: less than 0.05, between 0.05 and 0.15, between 0.15 and 0.25, 
and greater than 0.25. The height of each block indicates the number of 
firms falling into that range.  Each block  is decomposed  into cells  ac- 
cording to the firms' I/K in the preceding year. These cells illustrate the 
movement  of firms across  cells.  While the figures for 1986, 1987, and 
1988 indicate that firms change their investment  rates, they do not ap- 
pear to reflect any discernible bunching. If the change in the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986 was anticipated,  firms could have shifted investment  from 
1987 to 1986, before the investment tax credit was eliminated. The tran- 
sitions in figure 8 do not show a significant shift from higher investment 
rates into lower investment rates in 1987 and 1988. Figures for years sur- 
rounding the other major tax reforms reveal  similar patterns and are 
available from the authors on request. 
"Bunching" is not the only implication of irreversibility. In addition, 
the estimated coefficients  on tax variables should vary in a well-defined 
way  across  the different reform years.  Avinash  Dixit  and Robert Pin- 
dyck  develop  an example  of  tax  policy  uncertainty  in which  policy 
switches between regimes.74  There are different threshold criteria for in- 
vestment in the two regimes, and in each year there is some given proba- 
bility of enactment  of the "generous" or "stingy" regime.  If the stingy 
regime is currently in place, the greater the probability of enactment of 
the generous  regime in the next  year, and the greater the incentive  to 
delay investing today.  When the generous regime is in place,  the pros- 
pect of a subsequent switch to the stingy regime causes firms to increase 
current investment.  Since irreversibility can lead to long periods of inac- 
tion,  these  forces  cause  a bunching of investment  in the years  during 
which the generous regime is in place. Dixit and Pindyck present simula- 
tion results  that suggest  that there is asymmetry  associated  with this 
story.75 The value of bunching investment  is much greater when firms 
expect  the stingy regime to be followed  by a generous  one than when 
they expect a generous regime to be followed by a stingy one. This result 
74.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chap. 9). This example is based on Hassett  and Metcalf 
(1994). 
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Figure  8. Investment  Transitions  around  Tax Reforms 
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suggests that we should see a difference in the estimated  effects  of the 
user cost  or Q in years when the tax treatment of investment  is made 
more or less generous.76 In fact,  as shown in tables 5-10,  there is very 
little difference in coefficients  across the tax reform years. Compare, for 
example,  the coefficients  estimated in 1982 and 1987. In the tables,  the 
coefficients  are quite similar in these two years, even though investment 
tax policy moved in opposite directions. 
Hence,  while models of policy uncertainty and irreversibility provide 
insights into the determinants of business investment,  we do not believe 
that our results necessarily  favor these models.  Developing  testable dif- 
ferences  between neoclassical  models and models based on irreversibil- 
ity is an important task for future research. 
Further Macroeconomic  Implications 
Our results strongly suggest that shifts in the cross-sectional  distribu- 
tion of the net return to investing have significant effects on the composi- 
tion of investment.  If one accepts the assumptions  required to interpret 
our estimates  as "structural," then one can-with  great caution-make 
inferences  about the likely effects  of tax reform on the aggregate level 
of investment.  For example,  we can calculate the elasticity of aggregate 
investment with respect to the user cost of capital. Given that the mean 
values  of  equipment  (I/K) and the user  cost  of  capital in our sample 
are  similar (about  0.25),  our average  estimated  user  cost  coefficient 
of  -  0.66 translates into an elasticity of about  -  0.66. 
We can use this elasticity  to gauge the responsiveness  of equipment 
investment to the tax reforms. For example,  in response to the 1962 re- 
form, the changes in the user cost of capital and in our estimated coeffi- 
cient  imply  that  the  aggregate  equipment  investment-capital  ratio 
should have risen by about 0.01,  or about 7 percent.  (The investment 
capital ratio actually rose by 0.017, or about 11 percent.)  Our predicted 
change  corresponds  to  about  $7 billion  in  1987 prices.  The  absolute 
76.  In the neoclassical  model, bunching can occur if reforms are anticipated (see Nick- 
ell,  1978). Auerbach (1989) illustrates this mechanism: the change in the relative price of 
capital used to calculate the real interest rate includes F, so the user cost can increase sig- 
nificantly just before an investment  tax credit is introduced.  This effect is not, however, 
asymmetric,  since the adjustment cost function that connects  behavior in different periods 
is symmetric. The asymmetries  of the sort described in the text arise because irreversibil- 
ity constrains firms in periods where they would like to reduce their capital stocks. Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  53 
value of the predicted change of major tax reforms in our sample is also 
about 0.01. 
How  important have the tax changes  been? Many other fundamen- 
tals-for  example,  interest  rates,  productivity,  and  capital  goods 
prices-contribute  to fluctuations in investment.  Although we have pro- 
vided evidence  that tax parameters may contribute to movements  in in- 
vestment,  other things being equal, it is certainly true that tax parame- 
ters are seldom the only thing changing. Indeed, the predicted effects of 
large permanent tax reforms must only be a single piece  of the puzzle. 
The standard deviation of I/K over our sample period is 0.038. That is, 
the standard deviation of investment is roughly four times the mean pre- 
dicted effect of the major tax reforms in our sample. We argue here that 
changes in tax parameters are the easiest  of the fundamentals affecting 
investment  to measure,  and we are reassured that, in the end, a strong 
case can be made that they are important. However,  explaining the re- 
maining variation in investment  is likely to prove far more challenging, 
as the measurement error and simultaneity problems that provided the 
initial motivation for our work are probably more difficult to overcome 
when  attempting to evaluate  the contributions  of other nontax invest- 
ment fundamentals. 
We do not estimate here a structural model of links between  internal 
funds and investment.  Our estimated  coefficients  on "cash flow" in ta- 
bles 7, 8, and 10 suggest that changes in average tax rates might also af- 
fect  investment  by changing the internal funds available to financially 
constrained  firms. To the extent  that the investment  spending of such 
firms is quantitatively important, tax reforms may have an effect on in- 
vestment over and above that contained in the neoclassical  model.77 An 
application of our technique  to models  of investment  decisions  under 
imperfect  capital markets is a important task for future research,  one 
that might well explain a significant portion of the variation left unex- 
plained by this study. 
Conclusions 
We use tax reforms as natural experiments  in order to estimate  the 
responsiveness  of business fixed investment to underlying determinants 
77.  See, for example,  Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (forthcoming). 54  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
suggested by models stressing the net return to investing.  We argue that 
this  approach  significantly  reduces  measurement  error problems  that 
have plagued previous  attempts at estimation.  The estimates  of the ef- 
fects of tax-adjusted q or the user cost of capital on investment are much 
more economically  significant than those  obtained  in many previous 
studies  with more traditional techniques  and imply reasonable  adjust- 
ment costs  in both the tax-adjusted  q and user cost  of capital frame- 
works. We find that subsequent to every major business tax reform since 
1962, the  cross-sectional  pattern  of  investment  has  changed  signifi- 
cantly. Investment  spending in those firms facing the greatest change in 
tax incentives  responded the most.  In periods without tax reforms, we 
find no unusual response  in investment.  We also explore the sensitivity 
of our results to the inclusion of internal funds. Their inclusion does not 
qualitatively  alter our estimates  of the effects  of tax-adjusted q or the 
user cost of capital, although their importance suggests the desirability 
of studying "tax surprises" in internal funds. 
If one accepts the assumptions required to derive neoclassical  invest- 
ment  models,  our estimated  coefficients  on fundamental  variables  in 
those models may be interpreted as structural. In that case,  our findings 
suggest that long-lasting changes in corporate taxation can have signifi- 
cant effects on the level of business fixed investment.  At a minimum, our 
results suggest that the investment  models based on tax-adjusted q and 
the user cost  of capital, well understood  by business  people  and poli- 
cymakers,  may be useful for forecasting purposes. 
APPENDIX  A 
Model Derivations 
To  DERIVE the tax-adjusted q model,  we begin with an expression  for 
the value of the firm, which in turn stems from the arbitrage condition 
governing the valuation of shares.78 The after-tax return to the owners 
of the firm at time t reflects capital appreciation and current dividends. 
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In equilibrium, if the owners are to be content holding their shares, this 
return must equal their required return p: 
(A1)  [(I  -  z)(Ei,(Vi,+1  -  Si,+1)  -Vi) 
+  (1 - M)Ei,tDi,+]Vi,t  Pi., 
where i and t are the firm and time indexes,  respectively;  Ei, is the expec- 
tations operator of firm i conditional on information available at time t; 
V is the value of the firm's equity; S is the value of new shares issued; D 
represents the dividends the firm pays; z is an accrual-equivalent capital 
gains tax rate; and m is the personal tax rate on dividends. 
In the absence  of any speculative  bubbles,  solving equation Al  for- 
ward yields the following  expression  for the market value of the firm's 
equity at time t: 
(A2)  Vi  t = Ei,  t  ( iH  I3  Dis  -DSi  s)- 
s =t  =. 
where  ij  is the time j discount factor for firm i and qs equals (1 -  ms)l 
(1 -Zs). 
The firm maximizes equation A2 subject to five constraints.  The first 
is the capital stock accounting identity: 
Ki,t =  (1-  8i)Ki,t- I +  Iit,. 
where I denotes investment and K denotes the capital stock, and 8 is the 
rate of economic  depreciation. The second constraint defines firm "divi- 
dends" (net cash flow). Cash inflows consist  of sales,  new share issues, 
and net borrowing, while cash outflows consist of dividends, factor and 
interest payments,  and investment expenditures: 
Di,t  (I  (-T)[F(Ki,t_  I  9  Ni,,)  -  WNit  -  C(Iis,t  Ki,,_  1)-  it-  I  Bi,t- 1] 
+  Si,  + Bi,  -  (1 -  re) B1  -  pt(  -Fi)Ii  t, 
where T is the corporate tax rate; F(K,N)  is the firm's production func- 
tion (FK>  0, FKK <  0); C(I,K)  is the real cost  of adjusting the capital 
stock (CI  > 0, CI  >  0,  CK <  0,  CKK <  0); N is a vector of variable  factors 
of production; w is a vector of real factor prices; B is the market value of 
outstanding debt; i is the nominal interest rate paid on corporate bonds; 
Se  is expected inflation; p is the price of capital goods relative to the price 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
of output; and F is the tax benefit of investing.  For example,  with an in- 
vestment tax credit at rate k, F is 
i,  t=  ki, +  I  (1 +  rs +  re) -tTs DEPis  (s- 
s=t~~~~~~  s =  t 
where r is the default risk-free real interest rate (assumed to equal 4 per- 
cent), and DEPis(a)  is the depreciation allowance  permitted an asset of 
age a discounted  at a nominal rate that includes the expected  inflation 
rate Se. 
The third constraint restricts dividends to be nonnegative: 
Dit ? 0. 
The fourth constraint limits share repurchases: 
Si,t  , '. 
The fifth constraint is a transversality  condition  that prevents  the firm 
from borrowing an infinite amount to pay out dividends: 
lim (ii  I3')  BijT  0,  for all t. 
Turning first to the equilibrium value of marginal q, the solution for 
the case in which internal funds exceed  desired investment is familiar. If 
the dividend tax rate exceeds  the accrual-equivalent  tax rate on capital 
gains (m > z), it is never optimal to issue new shares and pay dividends 
simultaneously.  When we  abstract from corporate  tax considerations 
and adjustment costs,  the equilibrium value of marginal q is  q. At that 
value of q, shareholders  are indifferent between  a dollar of retentions 
reinvested  in the firm taxed at rate z and a dollar of dividends taxed at 
rate m. New  shares are issued only when internal funds are exhausted 
and the marginal q on additional projects exceeds  one. 
From the first-order condition for investment,  we obtain a relation- 
ship among the shadow price of additional capital, adjustment costs,  and 
tax parameters: 
(A3)  T[  )  (  ?  qi  )  ] 
where q is the shadow value of an increase in the capital stock (that is, 
marginal q). Equation A3 states that, after adjusting for tax considera- jason  u. uummlns,  Aevln A.  nasseur,  ana K. uienn  munnara  D I 
tions, the firm selects  an investment  rate at which the marginal cost of 
investment-including  the after-tax cost of the investment good and the 
marginal cost of adjustment-equals  the value of an incremental unit of 
installed capital, marginal q. 
To derive the equation we estimate,  we posit a quadratic adjustment 
cost function: 
(A4)  C(Ii~,t  Ki't-1)  =  - 
-  [i  K'-1  2 (Kji,t I 
where p. is steady-state  rate of investment  and cx  is the adjustment cost 
parameter.  Using  equation  A4  and rearranging terms in equation  A3 
yield 
(A5)  ii',  = VL  +  I [qi,t-  pt(1  -Fi,t)] 
Equation A5 is not empirically implementable since q is unobservable. 
If we assume a constant returns to scale production function and perfect 
competition,  we may equate marginal q to average q, defined for each 
firm as tax-adjusted q, 
(A6)  Qi . =  (Li, Vi, + Bit  -Ai  t)IK*tI, 
where L is an indicator function  equaling one if the firm is not paying 
dividends and q if the firm is paying dividends; A is the present value of 
the depreciation allowances  on investment made before period t; and K* 
is the replacement  value of the firm's capital stock  (including invento- 
ries). Hence we estimate 
(A7)  lit  1 (I  -_,  Li,Vj,  + B,,-Aj,t 
-  -(ri,t) 
The q formulation stresses a relationship between investment and the 
net profitability of investing,  as measured by the difference between the 
value of an incremental unit of capital and the tax-inclusive  cost of pur- 
chasing  capital.  Another  interpretation  is offered  in the  user  cost  or 
rental cost formulation suggested first by Jorgenson.79 The user cost of 
79.  Jorgenson (1963). capital is a rental rate on a unit of capital.  In principle,  the "price" of 
capital in the calculation  is the shadow price,  marginal q. Jorgenson's 
derivation instead relies on the price of the investment good,  p.80  In the 
user cost  setup, the firm equates the marginal cash flow from an incre- 
mental unit of capital equal to the user cost,  c: 
(A8)  (1 -  T) FK(Ki t- 1,  Ni,)  -  CK(Ii t, Ki ,_ 1) =  ci,t. 
In the steady state, CK equals zero, so that 
(A9)  (1  -  T)  FK(Ki  t  - I, Ni t) =  ci,. 
Jorgenson and various collaborators used equation A9 to derive an ex- 
pression  for the desired capital stock as a function  of the user cost  of 
capital and net revenue. The gap between the desired and actual capital 
stock was closed by an ad hoc mechanism (such as delivery lags). In the 
application presented  here, we follow  Auerbach.81  He begins with the 
Euler equation for investment  and assumes  a production function  and 
adjustment cost function similar to those described above (but including 
productivity  shocks).  He approximates the optimal solution for pertur- 
bations by solving a linearized version of the Euler equation. The struc- 
ture of the solution resembles equation A5, where the constant term is a 
function of the steady-state depreciation rate and a root of the linearized 
difference equation in K. The user cost coefficient  (  is a function of the 
steady-state  average  user cost  and a root of the linearized  difference 
equation in K. 
APPENDIX  B 
Data  Construction 
To CONSTRUCT  the depreciation rate 8 and the replacement value of cap- 
ital K*, we begin with the firm's book value of capital stock in the first 
year for which it is reported continuously.  We then employ the perpetual 
inventory method to estimate the rate of declining balance depreciation 
that  is  consistent  with  the  firm's  initial and terminal  capital  stocks. 
80.  The original derivation did not include adjustment costs. 
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Given this estimate of economic  depreciation,  we then estimate the cur- 
rent market value of the capital stock by multiplying the capital remain- 
ing from different vintages by the ratio of the price (using the price defla- 
tor for the capital stock) in the current year to that for the year in which 
the capital was purchased. This procedure necessarily  assumes that the 
initial capital stock was correctly valued on the firm's books. 
That is, we solve for 8 from the equation: 
(B 1)  KT  =  (1 -  8)TKO +  (1  -  8)T  K1 +  +  IT, 
where K, is the book capital stock at the end of the year t and It is invest- 
ment in year t; the variables are expressed  in constant  1987 dollars. Us- 
ing the estimated values of 8, we estimate firms' capital stock following 
Salinger and Summers.82 
For firms using the first in, first out method, inventories are valued at 
current cost  so that their book value and replacement value are equal. 
For firms using the last in, first out (LIFO) method, inventories are val- 
ued at historical cost. To convert the book value to market value, we use 
the same method as that for converting the capital stock. That is, we roll 
forward 
(B2)  Invtm =  Invt7l  p  +  Cinvt,  if Cinvt  -  Cinvt_  , 
*t-  1 
(B3)  Invt,77=  (Invtt7  1 +  Cinvtt)p  if Cinvtt < Cinvtt,, 
Pt-' 
where Invt;11  is the replacement value of LIFO inventories  at time t and 
Cinvtt is the change in LIFO inventories  in year t. 
82.  Salinger and Summers (1983). Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert  E.  Hall:  The fundamental approach of this paper-the  use  of 
major discrete tax reforms to find out how changes in the price of capital 
affect purchases of capital goods-is  an important step forward. The pa- 
per exploits rich panel data within this general approach. 
Before I turn to the substance of this approach, however,  I will com- 
ment on what I see  as a missed  opportunity in the paper-a  failure to 
clear up some  confusions  that have entered the investment  literature. 
The introduction describes the user cost or neoclassical  model of invest- 
ment, developed  by Dale Jorgenson,  as supplanted by the q theory, de- 
veloped  by James Tobin.  Although  the paper does  present  the major 
components  of the modern theory of investment,  it does  not stress the 
unity of the theory.  It may escape  the reader's attention  that modern 
thinking puts the Jorgenson  and Tobin relationships  on equal footings 
as, in effect, the demand and supply equations for investment.  The state- 
ment in the introduction, "By the 1980s, models based on the q represen- 
tations had largely replaced those  based on the user cost  of capital for 
analyzing investment,"  strikes me as the equivalent  of saying that the 
supply schedule has replaced the demand schedule.  I was always taught 
to interpret price and quantity as determined by the intersection  of de- 
mand and supply. 
The modern theory,  as shown by Fumio Hayashi  and, most neatly 
and compactly,  by Andrew Abel, portrays an internal market in the firm 
for installed capital.'  Jorgenson's  equation tells the firm to equate the 
marginal product of capital to the user cost,  where the user cost  takes 
the shadow value of installed capital, q, as its price, rather than the price 
charged by an outside  supplier of capital goods.  Thus, Jorgenson pro- 
1.  Hayashi (1982) and Abel (1990). Abel (1980) is also relevant. 
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vides the demand function for installed capital. On the supply side, the 
optimizing firm equates  the marginal cost  of purchasing and installing 
capital goods to the shadow value of installed capital, q. The supply side 
is Tobin's contribution. 
Jorgenson's  original model implicitly assumed perfectly  elastic  sup- 
ply of installed  capital at a price equal to the market price of capital 
goods.  In other words,  there were no adjustment costs  in Jorgenson's 
original model. To the extent that Jorgenson has been "supplanted," as 
claimed by this paper, it is that the supply equation for installed capital 
has been made less than perfectly elastic.  But the importance of the con- 
dition derived by Jorgenson-marginal  product of capital equals some 
concept of user cost-remains  just as great. 
The modern analysis of the demand side is nowhere stated in the pa- 
per, although it is implicit in the derivation of equation 9. Appendix  A 
states the "first-order condition for investment"  (the supply condition) 
to get the basic investment  supply relation, equation A7. It then charac- 
terizes  J-orgenson's approach as an alternative.  Equation A8 is the ap- 
propriate  demand-side  first-order  condition  needed  to  complete  the 
modern theory,  provided the user cost  on the right-hand side is evalu- 
ated using the shadow price of installed capital, q (as noted but not pur- 
sued in the text).  But even the reader who works carefully through ap- 
pendix  A  is likely  to  emerge  thinking that only  the  supply  condition 
matters and that the demand-side condition has been outmoded. 
Although  the  paper  neglects  the  demand  side  of  investment  alto- 
gether,  it does  look  at the intersection  of  supply and demand.  Equa- 
tion 9 is the  solution  of  the  supply  and demand equations.2  In other 
words, the two major empirical approaches taken in this paper are to es- 
timate the supply equation and the intersection  of supply and demand. 
Unfortunately,  the  authors  label  the  second  of these  approaches  the 
"User Cost  of Capital Results."  The authors note the relationship be- 
tween the two approaches but without giving the reader much hint that 
the second  is a hybrid. It would be redundant to work with supply, de- 
mand, and the intersection  of supply and demand. The paper drops out 
demand. I would prefer the symmetrical approach of working with sup- 
ply and demand, and then just  commenting  on the intersection.  All of 
the foregoing are problems of presentation,  not substance. 
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I found the goal of this paper somewhat  diffuse.  The paper wants to 
"analyze" or "explain" investment.  In fact, I think the paper actually has 
a much sharper research focus than it admits. More than anything else, 
it wants to overcome  the problem that almost all other research on the 
supply side of the investment  relationship has found-improbably  high 
adjustment costs and thus improbably long lags in investment.  The rela- 
tion between q and the flow of investment found in earlier work was too 
weak to make sense.  This paper does  a nice job of isolating a stronger 
relationship  by  eliminating periods  when  noise  dominates  the  move- 
ments of q. 
Because  the authors use rich panel data, they are able to exploit the 
important cross-sectional  variation in the effects  of tax rates. But, as I 
understand the results, they show that firms that invest a lot in the types 
of assets favored by a reform show the biggest effects  of those reforms. 
The paper is not able to perform the more conclusive  tests  that would 
come  from,  say,  purely  experimental  cross-sectional  differences  in 
taxes. 
Ricardo J. Caballero:  Like so many other papers in the investment lit- 
erature, this one starts by summarizing the empirical failure of models 
that emphasize the role of "price" variables in investment equations and 
by listing the standard culprits (simultaneity,  error in variables, and so 
forth). Unlike many others, it concludes  on a very positive note. By iso- 
lating the "exogenous"  cross-sectional  elements  of episodes  covering 
important tax reforms,  the authors claim to have eluded  the standard 
problems  and found evidence  of a large short-run response  of invest- 
ment to price incentives. 
The idea of isolating tax reform episodes  is one that has proved suc- 
cessful  before.  For example,  Peter Clark's 1993 BPEA  report contains 
elasticities  of equipment investment  with respect to changes  in the tax 
code that are substantially larger than the elasticities  of investment with 
respect to other components  of the cost of capital. I His estimates  were 
about half the size of the preferred ones in the current paper and not very 
precise,  however.  They also implied that the full impact of changes  in 
the  investment  tax  credit on investment  is not observed  until one  to 
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three years after these changes occur. The authors' main estimates  use 
two-year innovations and disregard dynamics,  so they are silent with re- 
spect to timing issues. 
To me, the contribution of this paper is that by using more than the 
usual amount of econometric  ingenuity, the authors have come out with 
estimates that are not only reasonable,  as were Clark's, but also precise 
and stable  across  years.  Overall,  it is one  of the most  interesting  at- 
tempts at measuring the effect  of relative prices on investment  I have 
seen lately.  I have four quibbles and remarks, however.  The first one is 
"expositional"; the second one refers to the potential role of intertempo- 
ral substitution  in explaining  the  findings; the  third one  is  about  ro- 
bustness;  and the last one is about policy. 
1.  My "expositional" complaint is that while the authors succeed  in 
generating an elasticity  that I suspect  we  all like,  they  are less  clear 
about exactly  where it came from. Spread throughout the paper, rather 
than succinctly  listed, are the standard culprits and the proposed reme- 
dies.  But there is no precise  statement as to which of the ingredients in 
their complex  medicine "cured the patient" and as to whether the cure 
has left the patient with a "life worth living." In what follows,  I propose 
a simple decomposition  that may help clarify why their estimates  came 
out the way they did. 
Starting from the basic equation relating investment  and Q linearly, 
one can decompose  Q into four components.  For this, let T and NT de- 
note the tax and nontax components  of Q. Further split each of these 
components,  so that PT  and PNT  denote the linear projection of T and 
NT onto t-  2 information, and let A  T  and ANT denote the corresponding 
forecasting  residuals.  Relaxing  the assumption  that the coefficient  on 
each  of  these  components  is  the  same,  we  arrive  at  the  regression 
equation: 
(1)  K  =  zy1zAT  +  'y2ANT  +  'y3PT  +  'y4PNT  +  E. 
I believe  most of the results in the paper can be understood in terms of 
this equation; and I even wonder why the authors did not estimate such 
an equation directly. The "standard q model" results presented in table 
3 correspond  to the case  where  all the ys are constrained  to be equal. 
The "modified q model" results presented in table 4, by contrast, are ob- 
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to the residual of the equation.2 As pointed out in the paper, comparing 
the fifth column in table 3 with the first column in table 4 shows that the 
estimate of y doubles with the removal of the nontax surprise. 
What do we learn from this comparison? It depends on what explains 
the increase  in y. Under the authors' assumptions  about timing, infor- 
mation, and the nature of adjustment costs,  I see three possibilities.  Re- 
laxing these assumptions,  I see another, potentially more damaging but 
perhaps more interesting, alternative. Let me postpone  a description of 
the latter until after I have finished clarifying their results according to 
their structure. First, if  Y2 is greater than zero and the nontax and tax 
components  are  positively  correlated,  the  omitted-variable  problem 
generated by the exclusion  of the nontax component  is positive,  so the 
results in table 4 are upwardly biased.  My sense is that this is unlikely, 
since equilibrium considerations  tend to imply the opposite correlation. 
Second,  Y2 may indeed equal zero,  in which case  the estimates  of y in 
table 3 are biased downward by the need to average across  all the ys. 
And third, the nontax component may be negatively correlated with the 
residual of the equation (negative simultaneity and error-in-variable bi- 
ases); in this case,  the estimates in table 3 are again downwardly biased, 
while those in table 4 are fine as long the potential omitted-variable prob- 
lem is not important. In the paper, the issues  are mixed, for the authors 
write that to avoid the simultaneity bias they assume that Y2  =  0, as if 
assumptions could solve the problem. I suspect they should use the third 
rather than the second argument. 
The most impressive results of table 4, however,  are those where ma- 
jor tax reform years are isolated. There y rises substantially. Where does 
this increase come from? Restricting my interpretation to their proposed 
structure, I see their findings in the following  terms: in years of tax re- 
form the variance of the first regressor in equation 1 is likely to rise rela- 
tive to that of the other regressors. If y  1 is substantially larger than Y3  and 
Y4, then y will be larger during tax reform years because  it is there that 
yl receives  its largest weight. Tables 5 and 6 are consistent  with this in- 
terpretation. There, by removing the projection on information at time 
t-  2 from both sides,  and maintaining the term 'y2zNT  in the residual, 
they estimate  yi directly. 
2.  This assumes that the projections are not too different firom  the actual values of the 
variables at t -  2, which I suspect is more consistent  with their assumptions  than with the 
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At this point, their result is mostly good news if one is concerned with 
estimating y1. If we really want to explain investment,  however,  the an- 
swer may be different. This relates to the "quality of life" issue  I men- 
tioned above, where the question is how much of the variance of the left- 
and right-hand-side variables has been removed with each of their steps. 
In my view,  they  should have reported the fraction of the variance of 
investment accounted for by each of the terms on the right-hand-side of 
equation 1. At this point I can only raise a warning flag: going back to the 
comparison of the results in the fifth column of table 3 with those in the 
first column of table 4, we see that the increase in the estimated coeffi- 
cient, when going from the former to the latter, comes at the cost of an 85 
percent  fall  in the R2. They emphasize the role of their steps in reducing 
standard measurement  error and simultaneity,  but they are much less 
transparent about the loss  of signal. Identification  seems  to have been 
achieved  with a very  small fraction of the variation of left- and right- 
hand-side  variables.  This may explain  some  of my problems reprodu- 
cing their results, an issue I will come back to in the robustness  section 
of my comments. 
2.  Up to now, I have followed  the authors and interpreted the differ- 
ences  across  ys mostly in terms of econometric  issues.  But there is also 
an economic  reason for the ys to differ. If one abandons the basic neo- 
classical  setup in favor of an arguably more realistic one, which empha- 
sizes  fixed costs  and recognizes  the  strong intertemporal substitution 
effects that are likely to be involved in temporary and sometimes  antici- 
pated tax reforms, then  y  is naturally larger, especially  so when tax re- 
form years are isolated. 
It is of great importance for policy  design to find out whether their 
preferred estimates are capturing permanent level effects or intertempo- 
ral substitution effects.  If the answer is the latter, then investment  tax 
credits can be used as a countercyclical  instrument, but for them to be 
powerful they have to be made transitory. Conversely,  if they have iden- 
tified a level effect,  there is more scope for long-term policy. 
Despite  the importance  of the issue,  however,  I do not think their 
handling of it adds much. They have three "quick" arguments against an 
intertemporal substitution interpretation of their findings, none of them 
very compelling,  either in isolation  or in conjunction.  The first one  is 
where they argue that Mark Doms  and Timothy Dunne's  finding-that 
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by less than 10 percent in a given year-contradicts  nonconvex  adjust- 
ment cost models.3 This is true only in an absurdly naive interpretation 
of the implications of models of fixed costs.  Of course,  literal inaction, 
as implied by pure fixed-cost  models,  is never observed  in actual data: 
in real life, firms have many different forms of investment  expenditure, 
some of which have no adjustment costs  whatsoever  or are completely 
unavoidable.  Quite the contrary, I interpret the Doms  and Dunne evi- 
dence as very supportive of fixed-cost theories,  since it shows that firms 
that do nothing most of the time (such as investing in minor upgrades and 
repairs) experience  infrequent but large adjustments that account for a 
large fraction of plants' and aggregate investment fluctuations. 
The authors' second argument is contained in figure 8, where they re- 
port the transitions across  sizes  of the investment-capital  ratio during 
and after the  1986 tax reform. Their conclusion  is that there is no evi- 
dence  of investment  concentration  during the reform year. In a sense, 
we already knew this. The entire paper, and to a large extent the empiri- 
cal literature on investment,  is about why we  do not see  much unless 
several factors are corrected for. I find quite remarkable that at this point 
they decided not to correct for individual effects and all the other things 
that only a few pages before they deemed so necessary before giving cre- 
dence to empirical findings. 
The last argument is based on the static implication of a model that 
does  not  take  into  consideration  a  series  of  dynamic  issues  that are 
quite important in models of nonconvex  adjustment costs.  Indeed,  his- 
tory dependence  is one of the main features of fixed-cost  models.  The 
authors'  implicit argument about asymmetries,  when  comparing  1982 
and  1987, is meaningless  without  describing  the set of circumstances 
that preceded  each  of these  episodes  and their effect  over  the cross- 
sectional distributions of pent-up investment. 
3.  As I intended to present  more than conjectures,  I asked the au- 
thors to send me a sample of their data. They were kind enough to send 
me not one but two samples: one with few firms (25) but many years (29), 
the other one with more firms (158) but fewer years (15). Unfortunately, 
I could not reproduce their results with these  samples.  Estimates  of y 
were quite constant  across  my counterparts of their tables 3, 4, and 5. 
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Furthermore,  my estimates  of the four  ys were  quite similar at about 
0.02, a result more along the "old" line.4 
They have attempted to explain my results arguing that my samples 
were too small. But I do not believe  that this is the whole  story, since I 
ran panel regressions  constraining the elasticity  coefficients  across  all 
tax reform years,  which means that most of my regressions  had more 
degrees  of freedom than their yearly regressions.  (I included time and 
individual effects,  of course.) 
Although it is certainly not comforting that the main results of the pa- 
per did not hold in these subsamples,  it should be noted that my samples 
were not  randomly chosen.  Perhaps they may use the sample selection 
issues  to identify the source of their large estimates.  An unlikely possi- 
bility, but one that should be considered,  is entry. My samples were bal- 
anced,  while theirs have a substantial flow of new firms over the years. 
And, as is often the case, incumbency may be positively  correlated with 
size and age. It seems important to find out whether entry plays any sub- 
stantive role in the estimate of y. I suspect,  however,  that more may be 
needed,  since entry does not influence their results early in the sample 
(relative to my sample), where they find the largest estimates for y1. 
4.  My final point is about heterogeneity  and policy.  If we  were  to 
model the microeconomic  side more properly, we would find aggregate 
investment equations that contain many cross-sectional  elements on the 
right-hand side. I wish we could take these into consideration when de- 
signing macroeconomic  policy. 
I am sure that to some extent this is done, but the authors' key identi- 
fying assumption suggests that this is rather imperfect. They argue that 
even  though time-series  information at the aggregate level  cannot  be 
used, because tax reforms are likely to be countercyclical,  they are still 
able to use the cross-sectional  variation. This implies, and I am sure they 
are right, that macroeconomic  policy does not fully consider microeco- 
nomic heterogeneity;  if it did, endogeneity  problems similar to those of 
the aggregate time-series  regressions  would plague cross-sectional  re- 
gressions too. I wonder whether in light of the heterogeneity  they docu- 
4.  I experimented  with different samples,  methods of decomposing  between  tax and 
nontax components,  and information sets.  I ran yearly and panel regressions.  For the lat- 
ter, I used individual and time effects,  as well as dummies for the years with tax reforms. 
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ment, and the mounting evidence  of microeconomic  nonlinearities,  we 
should not spend more effort trying to generate useful measures of heter- 
ogeneity  that can aid macroeconomic  policy,  even if as a result we are 
prevented from ever again running the authors' type of regressions. 
General  Discussion 
In response  to Robert Hall's criticism of "horse race" exercises,  the 
authors explained that they had not run a race. Rather, they included q 
and the user cost equations to verify that alternative representations  of 
the neoclassical  theory yielded similar results. Daniel Sichel offered two 
reasons why horse races might be useful.  First, even if an investigator 
is not testing competing theoretical frameworks,  choices  must be made 
about how to implement a model empirically, and a natural way to evalu- 
ate these choices  is to subject different specifications  to a forecast test. 
Second,  forecasting is the goal of some research. However,  Kevin Has- 
sett noted that forecast tests can be misused by loading up an alternative 
specification  with too many variables.  Anil Kashyap  noted that, while 
the two approaches were equivalent under the assumptions  of constant 
returns, perfect competition,  and quadratic adjustment costs,  under al- 
ternative assumptions one of the approaches might be more useful than 
the other. Glenn Hubbard and William Brainard noted that implement- 
ing user cost models requires information about discount rates and ex- 
pected future user costs.  The q model relies on financial markets to pro- 
vide  this  information.  This  difference  would  be important in a panel 
study where it is difficult to get firm-specific expected  rates of return. 
Responding  to  Ricardo  Caballero's  comments,  Hassett  suggested 
that there is no good economic  reason to expect  differences  in the re- 
sponses  to the four components  of tax-adjusted q identified by Cabal- 
lero.  Caballero  responded  that  intertemporal  substitution,  combined 
with different persistence  of components,  provides a rationale for distin- 
guishing among them.  Hassett  also  noted that Caballero's  inability to 
replicate the paper's results using the long, balanced panel the authors 
provided is not surprising. Only a small number of firms had a complete 
time  series,  drastically  reducing  the  cross-sectional  variation  in that 
sample. Moreover, for that nonrandom sample, even the basic q-model 
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Discussion  turned to the policy question of how much tax changes af- 
fect  investment.  Hall highlighted the fact that knowing the coefficient 
on tax-adjusted q is not sufficient for policy  purposes;  tax changes,  by 
altering the present discounted  value of after-tax profits, affect q itself. 
Brainard  identified  another  potential  difficulty  in  using  the  paper's 
cross-sectional  results for evaluating the aggregate effects of policy. The 
paper identifies the cross-sectional  effects of tax surprises on individual 
firms; but these estimates  include the reallocation of investment  across 
firms, since some benefit relative to others.  A tax change that affected 
all firms in the same way would not produce these  reallocation  effects 
and may have a smaller effect on aggregate investment than is suggested 
by the cross-sectional  estimates. 
Finally,  Brainard noted that the cross-sectional  variation in taxation 
may not be entirely exogenous.  Presumably, the legislators considering 
tax reforms-for  example, changing the depreciation allowances for dif- 
ferent types  of capital goods-were  aware that they would  especially 
benefit particular sectors; the reforms may have been motivated, in part, 
by a desire to boost investment  in those sectors. 70  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
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